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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In December 2015, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) use of 
various social media tools in a rulemaking under the Clean Water 
Act violated prohibitions in federal appropriations laws against pub-
licity, propaganda, and lobbying.1 Although academics previously ex-
plored whether the use of technology in rulemaking might violate the 
                                                                                                                  
 ∗ Walter F. George Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. B.S., J.D. Vil-
lanova University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law. 
 1. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-B-326944, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY—APPLICATION OF PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA AND ANTI-LOBBYING PROVISIONS 
(2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674163.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9DC-LPL8] [hereinaf-
ter GAO Report]. 
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Administrative Procedures Act (APA),2 the Paperwork Reduction 
Act,3 or the Federal Advisory Committee Act,4 none predicted that 
one of the first firestorms surrounding the use of social media in 
rulemaking would arise out of federal appropriations laws.5  
 While critics of the EPA Waters of the United States (WOTUS) 
rule6 vigorously chastised the agency for its ‘illegal activity,’7 a close 
reading of the GAO report indicates that the agency’s violations of ap-
propriations rules were relatively minor and could be easily avoided in 
the future.8 Despite the outcry in the wake of the report, an analysis of 
the appropriations legislation demonstrates that it poses very few re-
strictions, in practice, on agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking.9  
 However, an analysis of the WOTUS rulemaking and the manner 
in which EPA used social media in the rulemaking demonstrates that 
agencies may decide to use social media in rulemaking for a variety 
of reasons, some of which are more legally defensible than others. 
Proponents of the use of social media in rulemaking tout its potential 
for educating the public, gathering more information from a broader 
range of participants, and developing better, more democratic, and 
more widely accepted rules.10 Through its Regulation Room project, 
Cornell University’s eRulemaking Initiative has partnered with vari-
ous federal agencies to demonstrate effective, though resource-
intensive, ways to use technology and social media to meet those 
                                                                                                                  
 2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596 (2012).  
 3. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2012).  
 4. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012)).  
 5. See, e.g., Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
893 (2011); Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011); Ste-
phen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a Vision for 
Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 78 
(2013) [hereinafter Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects]; Keith W. Rizzardi, Why Don’t 
FACA Committees Like Facebook? Social Media, Public Input, and the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, 9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 75 (2014).  
 6. The rule that sparked the controversy was a rule adopted by EPA under the Clean 
Water Act to define the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” un-
der the statute. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. 
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015).  
 7. See, e.g., Rich Edson, EPA Under Fire for Social Media ‘PR Campaign’ Pushing 
Water Regs, FOXNEWS.COM, (May 26, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/05/26/ 
epa-under-fire-for-social-media-pr-campaign-pushing-water-regs.html 
[https://perma.cc/4CY4-RKER]; Eric Lipton & Coral Davenport, Critics Hear E.P.A.’s Voice 
in ‘Public Comments’, N.Y. TIMES, (May 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/us/ 
critics-hear-epas-voice-in-public-comments.html [hereinafter Lipton & Davenport, Critics].  
 8. See infra Part IV.  
 9. See infra Part IV.  
 10. See infra Part I.  
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goals.11 However, an agency might also be tempted to use social me-
dia tools in the rulemaking process to evangelize, rather than edu-
cate, and to contour information (selectively promote the submission 
of information to support a predetermined outcome). While EPA did 
not cross that line in the WOTUS rulemaking, when an agency uses 
social media to evangelize and contour information, it can run afoul 
not only of prohibitions in appropriations laws, but also of require-
ments of the APA.12 Although the violation of appropriations laws 
would only trigger minor sanctions, violation of the APA require-
ments could trigger invalidation of the agency rule.13  
 Further, when an agency uses social media to evangelize and con-
tour information, the public (or certain segments of the public) may 
feel that the agency is merely using the rulemaking process as a tool 
to build public support and a judicially defensible record for an out-
come that was determined before the agency sought public input. In 
those cases, the agency risks sacrificing all of the benefits that are 
normally associated with public participation in a transparent, open 
rulemaking process, including public support and acceptance for the 
final rule, ease of enforcement, and reduced judicial challenges.14 In 
an attempt to develop public support, the agency might actually 
spark hostility and increase the likelihood of a challenge to its rules. 
 As the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) 
recently recommended, therefore, agencies should think carefully 
about what legitimate goals they expect to achieve through the use of 
social media in rulemaking before embarking on rulemaking and de-
velop a strategy for using social media tools in a manner that best 
achieves those legitimate goals.15 
 This Article examines the benefits of using social media in rule-
making, the limitations imposed on the use of social media by appro-
priations laws and the APA, and the practical considerations in-
volved in choosing the right mix of social media tools for rulemaking. 
Part I of the Article outlines the various goals that agencies might 
                                                                                                                  
 11. CORNELL UNIV., CeRI: Cornell eRulemaking Initiative, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ 
ceri/ [https://perma.cc/45BS-596M]; see also Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra 
note 5, at 107-12. Students and faculty from Cornell work with federal agencies and use a 
variety of tools beyond those used by most agencies in the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process to expand the universe of persons participating in the rulemaking process, educate 
the public about the process and the issues involved in a proposed rule, and improve the 
quality of public comments on rules. Id.  
 12. See infra Part V.  
 13. See infra Part V.  
 14. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.  
 15. See Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendation 2013-5: 
Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269, 76,271 (Dec. 17, 2013) (adopted Dec. 5, 
2013; not published in the C.F.R.) [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 2013-5]. 
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have when choosing to use social media tools in rulemaking. Part II 
explores the variety of social media tools that are available to agen-
cies and provides a brief overview of federal support for the use of 
those tools in rulemaking. Part III examines the extent to which so-
cial media tools can actually achieve the goals that motivate agencies 
to use them. Part IV outlines the limits imposed on agencies’ use of 
social media by appropriations laws, and Part V outlines the APA 
challenges that might be raised if agencies use social media to evan-
gelize and contour information in the rulemaking process. Finally, 
Part VI provides some concluding suggestions regarding the appro-
priate use of social media tools in rulemaking.  
II.   WHY AGENCIES MIGHT USE SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING 
 As the federal government embraced e-Rulemaking at the begin-
ning of this century, proponents extolled the benefits of using tech-
nology to create better, more defensible, and more widely accepted 
rules through a more democratic and transparent process.16 While 
early e-Rulemaking efforts have not yet revolutionized the rulemak-
ing process in the manner that supporters hoped they would,17 advo-
cates for the increased use of social media in rulemaking tout many 
of the same potential benefits for those tools. Supporters argue that 
the effective use of social media tools can involve broader and more 
diverse segments of the public in the development of rules,18 educate 
the public about proposed rules and the rulemaking process so that 
they can provide better input into that process,19 change the nature 
of public participation in the rulemaking process to create opportuni-
ties for dialogue and interaction between commenters,20 and increase 
the transparency of the rulemaking process.21 All of those benefits 
may be possible when the tools are used by an agency that enters the 
                                                                                                                  
 16. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation 
and Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 898-99 (2006); Dooling, supra note 5, at 896; 
Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 92-94; Stephen M. Johnson, The 
Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Govern-
ment Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 304 (1998); Jeffrey S. 
Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rulemakers’ Attitudes About E-Rulemaking, 62 
ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 453-54 (2010); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in 
Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 473-74 (2004).  
 17. See infra Part II.  
 18. See MICHAEL HERZ, USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING: POSSIBILITIES AND 
BARRIERS, FINAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 
21, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Herz%20Social%20Media% 
20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP83-BDNW]; see also infra Part I.A. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.  
 20. See infra Part I.C.  
 21. See infra Part I.D.  
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rulemaking process with a genuine interest in receiving broad public 
input and a willingness to make changes to the rule in ways that are 
informed by that input.  
 However, social media tools can also be used by agencies for more 
nefarious purposes. If an agency begins the rulemaking process with 
a predetermined outcome in mind, hoping to use the process to culti-
vate public support for that outcome and to develop a judicially de-
fensible record to support that outcome, an agency might use social 
media tools in the rulemaking process to evangelize, rather than edu-
cate, and to contour information (promote the public submission of 
information to support the agency’s desired outcome), rather than to 
simply gather information. It is in those cases that agencies are most 
likely to act in contravention of the APA or appropriations laws.22  
A.   Generating Broader Public Participation  
 Very few citizens participate in the traditional federal notice-and-
comment rulemaking process.23 In general, regulated entities, trade 
associations, and professional organizations submit most of the com-
ments on proposed rules, while regulatory beneficiaries and private 
citizens are largely silent.24 Thus, through the traditional rulemaking 
process, agencies are frequently only hearing part of the story regard-
ing the impacts of their rules.25 Federal agencies recognize, however, 
that social media tools like Facebook and Twitter can play an im-
                                                                                                                  
 22. See infra Parts IV and V.  
 23. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Net-
working and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 386 (2011); John-
son, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78. Several studies examining rulemak-
ing by different agencies at different times have found that fewer than thirty-five com-
ments are provided by citizens on most proposed rules. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual 
Suspects, supra note 5, at 82. The WOTUS rule that is the subject of this Article is an ex-
ception to that rule, but there have been other rulemakings in the past that have also gen-
erated significant public input. For instance, 250,000 comments were submitted for a 1997 
rule addressing standards for organic products, and hundreds of thousands of comments 
were submitted on the Federal Communications Commission’s rules on the concentration 
of media ownership, an EPA rule regarding mercury emissions, and a Forest Service rule 
banning construction of roads in wilderness areas. Id.  
 24. See Steven J. Balla & Benjamin M. Daniels, Information Technology and Public 
Commenting on Agency Regulations, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 46 (2007); Cary Coglianese, 
Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006); 
Farina et al., supra note 23, at 386, 423; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 
5, at 78; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward Business? Assessing 
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006). While public in-
terest organizations provide comments on major rulemakings, they have limited resources, 
so they must be judicious in deciding when to participate in the process. See Wendy E. 
Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 
1378-79 (2010). 
 25. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 5.  
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portant role in broadening and diversifying participation in the rule-
making process.26 One of the greatest barriers to public participation 
in the rulemaking process is the lack of public awareness that most 
rulemakings are occurring.27 Social media tools provide great promise 
for reducing that barrier and spreading the word that government 
agencies are seeking public input on important proposed rules or on 
important issues prior to the development of proposed rules.28  
 Ideally, those tools could help agencies gather expert opinion from 
sources other than the major regulated entities and trade associa-
tions that normally participate in the process.29 They could help 
agencies gather the local and situational knowledge about the con-
crete impacts of a proposed rule on communities, small businesses, 
                                                                                                                  
 26. EPA’s Social Media Policy identifies “increased ability . . . to engage and collabo-
rate with . . . the American public” as a major benefit of using social media. OFFICE OF 
ENVTL. INFO., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CIO 2184.0, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 1, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/documents/social_media_policy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WRF6-ETKP] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA 
POLICY]. Similarly, the agency’s Facebook Guidance notes that Facebook “[a]llows [EPA] to 
reach out to people who use Facebook but may not engage the government in more formal, 
traditional ways.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA FACEBOOK GUIDANCE, 
http://govsocmed.pbworks.com/w/page/27521304/EPA [https://perma.cc/4SE3-3H9H] [here-
inafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE]. In discussing Twitter, EPA 
notes that “when followers ‘retweet’ . . . our message has the potential to spread far beyond 
our own followers. . . . [I]t’s another channel beyond epa.gov where people gather, so we can reach a 
broader audience with our existing messages.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA TWITTER 
GUIDANCE, http://govsocmed.pbworks.com/w/page/27521294/EPA [https://perma.cc/67MF-UTUJ] 
[hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE].  
 27. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 9, 32; Anne E. Boustead & Karlyn D. Stanley, The 
Legal and Policy Road Ahead: An Analysis of Public Comments in NHTSA’s Vehi-
cle-to-Vehicle Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 693, 
706 (2015); Farina et al., supra note 23, at 385, 389-90; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Sus-
pects, supra note 5, at 84. Prior to eRulemaking efforts, notice of proposed rulemaking was 
often limited to publication in the Federal Register, which is not frequently read by aver-
age citizens. See Anne E. Boustead & Karlyn D. Stanley, The Legal and Policy Road 
Ahead: An Analysis of Public Comments in NHTSA's Vehicle-to-Vehicle Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 693, 706 (2015). Even in the eRulemak-
ing era, few citizens spend much time following rules on Regulations.gov, although the site 
allows users to sign up for e-mail alerts to track proposed rules or other regulatory actions. 
See REGULATIONS.GOV, How to Use Regulations.gov, https://www.regulations.gov/#!help 
[https://perma.cc/BM42-S5CR].  
 28. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32; see also infra Part III.A. However, increased pub-
lic awareness about proposed rules, in and of itself, will not necessarily result in broader 
and more diverse participation in the rulemaking process as there are other barriers to 
participation and as individuals will frequently not be motivated to comment on rules un-
less the effects of the rule on them are great enough to justify the cost of participating in 
the process. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 706. 
 29. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 
5, at 83. Professor Cynthia Farina and her colleagues believe that members of the public 
will be motivated to share their expertise with agencies through web-based interactions in 
rulemaking in the same way that they have donated their expertise to develop Wikipedia 
or to help patent examiners identify prior art through the PeerToPatent project. See Fari-
na et al., supra note 23, at 424.  
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and individuals that the agency frequently cannot access through the 
traditional notice-and-comment process.30 When an agency has access 
to more complete information, it can identify and address issues that 
it might not otherwise have considered adequately.31 As a result, the 
agency should be able to develop better rules in that they are more 
rational and defensible than if they were developed without the bene-
fit of the additional input.32  
 Broader public participation has many other benefits. A broadly 
inclusive process that is carried out in a transparent manner will be 
viewed as a much more democratic process.33 To the extent that par-
ticipants in the process can better understand a rule and feel that the 
rulemaking process was carried out in a manner that allowed them 
to have their views heard and addressed, they should be less antago-
nistic towards the final rule.34 Ideally, they should be less likely to 
challenge the rule and the rule should be easier to enforce.35 Fewer 
legal challenges and greater acceptance of rules should reduce costs 
and resource demands for agencies, as litigation to defend rules and 
to enforce rules against recalcitrant violators is time consuming and 
                                                                                                                  
 30. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 424-26; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, 
supra note 5, at 83. “Local knowledge” is “the first-hand experience of those who deal di-
rectly with the objects and targets of rulemaking.” Farina et al., supra note 23, at 426. It is 
the insight that a local sanitation engineer could provide to EPA about implementing 
drinking water standards that the national trade organization for water treatment plants 
might not be able to provide. See Cary Coglianese, Weak Democracy, Strong Information: 
The Role of Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process, in GOVERNANCE AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: FROM ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT TO INFORMATION 
GOVERNMENT 101, 117 (Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & David Lazer eds., 2007). 
 31. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 79; Stephen M. Johnson, 
Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 702-03, 735 (2007); Nina A. Mendelson, Regu-
latory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 402 (2007). 
 32. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 706; John-
son, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 83; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION GUIDE 1, 5, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/ 
documents/ppg_english_full-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JS7-W79Y] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION GUIDE].  
 33. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2, 6; Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 702-03; 
Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 80. 
 34. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, 
at 79-80. 
 35. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, 
at 79-80; David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision 
Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 677-78 
(2006); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 
459 (2004); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION GUIDE, supra note 
32, at 5. Conversely, as more persons participate in the rulemaking process, there are more 
persons who might be disappointed with the outcome and who might, therefore, choose to 
challenge the rule.  
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expensive.36 Similarly, the public can receive the benefits that rules 
are designed to provide more quickly when the rules are not chal-
lenged and when the regulated community acts quickly to come into 
compliance. Even if broader participation does not reduce challenges 
to agencies’ rules, it provides the agencies with more information 
about the level of public support for, or opposition to, rules as they 
are being developed.37  
 Broader public participation can also be instrumental in reducing 
opportunities for agency capture.38 The traditional notice-and-
comment process is dominated by a few major players,39 and empiri-
cal studies have demonstrated systemic biases in favor of regulated 
entities in rulemakings where the public input is dominated by those 
entities.40 Broader public participation can help counterbalance that 
disproportionate input.  
B.   Educating the Public 
 While agencies might use social media tools to broaden and diver-
sify the pool of participants in the rulemaking process, they might 
also use them to educate the public about the rules for which they are 
seeking public input and to educate the public about the rulemaking 
                                                                                                                  
 36. Between 1998 and 2010, for instance, the Justice Department spent $46.9 million 
just to defend EPA in lawsuits challenging its rules. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-15-803T, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: INFORMATION ON CASES AGAINST EPA AND FWS 
AND ON DEADLINE SUITS ON EPA RULEMAKING (2015), http://gao.gov/assets/680/671846.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3V6Y-PXTT].  
 37. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 428-29; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, 
supra note 5, at 80. 
 38. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78. Agency capture 
occurs “when organized groups successfully act to vindicate their interests through gov-
ernment policy at the expense of the public interest.” Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. 
Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1343 (2013). 
Academics frequently cite broad participation in a transparent process as a safeguard 
against regulatory capture. Id. at 1356; see also STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND 
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 293 (2008); Mi-
chael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term: Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Delibera-
tion, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59 (1998).  
 39. The process tends to be dominated by a small number of regulated entities, indus-
try trade associations, and, to a lesser extent, non-governmental organizations. See supra 
notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 4-5. Even when an 
agency isn’t “capture[d],” it tends to reach out more frequently to regulated entities than to 
regulatory beneficiaries for input in policy development because (1) the agency directly 
interacts with regulated entities, so it knows their identities, while it may not know the 
identities of regulatory beneficiaries; (2) the agency is interested in maintaining a good 
long-term relationship with regulated entities; and (3) regulatory entities are more likely to 
have information about a policy’s costs and feasibility than regulatory beneficiaries or the 
agency itself. See Mendelson, supra note 31, at 429-30.  
 40. See Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s 
Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 108-09 (2011).  
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process itself.41 Education can address some of the major barriers to 
broader public participation in the rulemaking process. Although 
rulemakings frequently have significant impacts on the public, citi-
zens often do not participate in the process because the issues in-
volved in the rulemaking and the language of the rulemaking (often 
written on a graduate school reading level) are complex, technical, 
and difficult to understand.42 The volume of information that someone 
may need to review in order to provide effective comments on a rule 
may be staggering, leading to information overload.43 Further, citizens 
may decline to provide comments on a rule because the technocratic 
nature of the process leads them to believe that their comments will be 
ignored or that they have nothing worthwhile to provide.44  
 Even when citizens provide comments on a proposed rule, their 
comments may be less effective than comments provided by the regu-
lated entities, trade associations, and non-governmental organiza-
tions because citizens don’t fully comprehend the manner in which 
their input can or will be used by the agency in the rulemaking pro-
cess.45 They may not understand that in most cases, rulemaking is 
not a plebiscite, so that a simple expression of support for, or opposi-
tion to, a rule is not likely to have a significant impact on the formu-
lation of the rule.46 Similarly, they may not understand that the 
agency does not have the statutory authority to take an approach 
that they are suggesting.47 Consequently, they frequently submit 
comments that address issues of values and policy; agencies generally 
give those types of comments little weight, regardless of the volume of 
comments in support of a specific value or policy.48 By contrast, the 
repeat players that dominate the notice-and-comment process often 
address the scientific and technical issues that are central to the agen-
cy’s rule and provide data and analyses to support their comments.49 
                                                                                                                  
 41. EPA stresses the educational value of social media tools in its Facebook Guidance 
and Twitter Guidance. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE, supra note 
26; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE, supra note 26. 
 42. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 385, 437-38. Describing the rules that the Cor-
nell eRulemaking Initiative included in its Regulation Room pilot program to improve pub-
lic participation through technology, Professor Farina observed that the notice of proposed 
rulemaking for one of the Department of Transportation rules in the program was twenty-
two pages long, written at a post-graduate reading level, and accompanied by a 107-page 
regulatory impact analysis. Id. at 437-38.  
 43. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32; Farina, et al., supra note 23, at 389-90; Johnson, 
Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 84-85.  
 44. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 84-86. 
 45. Id. at 85.  
 46. Id. at 85-86.  
 47. Id. at 89.  
 48. Id. at 88.  
 49. Id. at 87.  
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“Agencies tend to give [those] comments significant weight” because 
they understand that the repeat players are likely to challenge the fi-
nal rule in court, and the rule will be invalidated if the agency does not 
adequately address the issues raised in those comments.50  
 Many of the barriers to public participation in the rulemaking 
process can be reduced through education. Agencies can take steps to 
make the language of proposed rules and the documents supporting 
the rules easier to understand, to summarize the issues involved in 
the rulemaking more succinctly, and to educate the public about the 
rulemaking process and the type of public comments that can be the 
most helpful and effective.51 Better educated and informed citizens 
should provide better and more effective input, which should improve 
the quality of the rules adopted by agencies. In addition, the educa-
tion efforts by agencies should increase the volume of citizen partici-
pation in the rulemaking process. 
 Beyond those benefits, when citizens learn more about the rule-
making process and the issues involved in a rule, they will develop a 
greater understanding of the rule and the reasoning behind the 
rule.52 Ideally, this should lead to greater acceptance of rules which 
will make them easier to enforce and less likely to be challenged.53  
 In light of all of those benefits, it is not surprising that education 
is central to the mission of many agencies. In the environmental are-
na, Congress recognized the need for greater public education when it 
enacted the National Environmental Education Act, finding that 
“[e]ffective response to complex environmental problems requires un-
derstanding of the natural and built environment, awareness of envi-
ronmental problems and their origins . . . , and the skills to solve 
those problems” and that “[c]urrent Federal efforts to inform and ed-
ucate the public concerning the natural and built environment and 
environmental problems are not adequate.”54 The law imposes a duty 
on EPA to address that deficiency and requires the agency to work 
with schools, nongovernmental organizations, broadcasting entities, 
and the private sector to develop programs and activities to improve 
awareness of environmental problems.55 It creates an Office of Envi-
                                                                                                                  
 50. Id.  
 51. Some of the tools used by the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative in its Regulation 
Room to summarize the issues in proposed rules, make the rules more readable, and edu-
cate the public regarding the comment process and effective commenting are discussed in 
Part IV of this Article.  
 52. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
GUIDE, supra note 32, at 5; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 79-80. 
 53. See sources cited supra note 52. 
 54. 20 U.S.C. § 5501(a)(4), (6) (2012). 
 55. § 5501(a)(8). 
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ronmental Education within EPA, which is required to develop and 
support programs and related efforts to improve the understanding of 
the environment, develop and disseminate environmental education 
materials, and otherwise provide for implementation of the law.56 
The Federal Clean Water Act, pursuant to which EPA published the 
WOTUS rule, emphasizes the importance of encouraging and assist-
ing citizen participation in the development of rules under the law,57 
and therefore, educating the public to facilitate that participation 
falls comfortably within EPA’s responsibilities under the Clean Wa-
ter Act and the National Environmental Education Act.  
 It seems only natural that agencies, including EPA, might turn to 
social media and other technologies to advance their educational mis-
sion because Congress enacted the E-Government Act of 2002 “[t]o 
promote use of the Internet and other information technologies to pro-
vide increased opportunities for citizen participation in Government” 
and “[t]o promote better informed decisionmaking by policy makers.”58  
C.   Changing the Nature of Public Participation  
 While agencies might choose to use social media tools to broaden 
citizen participation in rulemaking or to educate those citizens, they 
might also use the tools to change the nature of public participation 
in the rulemaking process. Traditional notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing is frequently criticized because it does not provide an opportunity 
for dialogue between the agency and commenters or between the 
commenters.59 In the traditional process, comments are provided to 
the agency during the notice period, and the agency considers and 
responds to the comments after the notice period closes. Until the 
advent of e-rulemaking, commenters generally were not aware of the 
comments that other commenters were submitting, and many com-
menters waited until the last minute to submit their comments in 
order to prevent any other commenters who happened to learn about 
the substance of the comments from rebutting the comments.60 In con-
trast, Professor Cynthia Farina notes that the ideal public comment 
period “would create a knowledge-advancing exchange during which 
participants react to the agency’s proposal, respond to each other’s 
comments, vet claims and data, and discuss alternative approaches.”61 
                                                                                                                  
 56. § 5503(b)(1), (3). 
 57. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2012).  
 58. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 2(b)(2), (7), 116 Stat. 2899, 2901 (2002). 
 59. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 5; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78.  
 60. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78, 90.  
 61. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 418. 
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 Although agencies have not taken advantage of technology in the 
first generation of e-rulemaking to transform rulemaking into a 
more collaborative and dialogic process, agencies might utilize so-
cial media tools to attempt to achieve that goal.62 EPA’s social me-
dia policies, for example, extol the benefits of using social media “to 
engage and collaborate with . . . the American public.”63 EPA’s Fa-
cebook guidance urges employees to “[e]ncourage discussion among 
fans by asking questions[:] . . . Ask for your community’s thoughts, 
experiences, and stories[, and] [l]isten to what they’re saying and 
respond as appropriate.”64 Similarly, EPA’s Twitter guidance re-
minds employees that Twitter “gives us a chance to respond to dis-
cussions about us or our mission.”65  
D.   Improving Transparency of the Rulemaking Process  
 Agencies may also choose to use social media tools to make the no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking process more transparent.66 Like educa-
tion, transparency should lead to greater public understanding and 
acceptance of rules.67 As noted above, these efficiencies should ease 
enforcement for agencies and reduce the number of legal challenges 
brought against rules.68 EPA’s social media policy identifies transpar-
ency as a major objective for the agency’s use of social media.69  
E.   Evangelization  
 Agencies that are genuinely interested in seeking out as much in-
formation as possible during the rulemaking process and remain flex-
ible regarding the substance of the rule throughout the rulemaking 
process are likely to use social media tools, if they use them, to 
achieve one or more of the goals outlined above. There are times, 
however, when agencies may be tempted to use those tools for less 
commendable purposes. Cynics argue that agencies rarely enter the 
rulemaking process with an interest in having their rules trans-
                                                                                                                  
 62. Id. at 422; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 5; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Sus-
pects, supra note 5, at 79-80. 
 63. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 1; see also 
OFFICE OF ENVTL. INFO., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CIO 2184.0-P02.1, USING SOCIAL MEDIA 
TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PUBLIC (2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/ 
documents/comm_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF24-2MU3] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, USING SOCIAL MEDIA].  
 64. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE, supra note 26.  
 65. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE, supra note 26. 
 66. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78. 
 67. Id. at 79.  
 68. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.  
 69. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 63, at 1.  
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formed by the process and that the public input in the process comes 
too late.70 In the oft-cited words of Professor E. Donald Elliott, “No-
tice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese 
Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for 
displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life 
takes place in other venues.”71 
 While that portrayal of the rulemaking process may be a bit too 
pessimistic, there are certainly times when an agency might enter 
the rulemaking process with a desire to minimize changes to its pro-
posed rule and to use the notice-and-comment process to build public 
support for the approach the agency has chosen in the proposed rule. 
Such an agency may be tempted to use social media tools to evange-
lize the agency’s work. Although rulemaking is not a plebiscite, 
strong public support for a rule can counteract aggressive lobbying by 
regulated entities seeking Congressional legislation or Executive ac-
tion to overturn the rule. While broadening public participation, fur-
thering public education, increasing transparency and transforming 
the nature of the rulemaking process can all indirectly promote pub-
lic support for agency rules, evangelization is a much more direct at-
tempt to cultivate that support. Evangelization can have detrimental 
effects for an agency, though, in that it could strengthen opposition to 
the agency’s rule from regulated entities if they believe that the 
agency improperly cultivated support for the rule (and antagonism 
towards the concerns advanced by the regulated entities).72 That op-
position could generate additional negative comments from oppo-
nents during the rulemaking process and increased likelihood of liti-
gation at the end of the process.73  
 Evangelization differs from education in the goals that each seek 
to achieve. Evangelization involves advocating a doctrine or idea with 
the object of making converts,74 whereas education simply involves 
providing persons with training or information. An agency evangeliz-
es to shape public input and support for a specific position. An agency 
educates to improve public input and generate support for whatever 
rule the agency ultimately adopts, regardless of whether it was the 
rule advanced by the agency at the outset of the rulemaking. At 
times, it may be difficult to distinguish education from evangeliza-
                                                                                                                  
 70. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78, 86; Dorit Rubinstein 
Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 330-35 (2009).  
 71. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992). 
 72. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.  
 73. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Evangelize, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/evangelize 
[https://perma.cc/5FDY-2WNJ]. 
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tion. In the EPA WOTUS rulemaking, legislators, regulated industry 
trade groups, and journalists argued that the agency used social me-
dia tools to manufacture grass roots support for, and drown out oppo-
sition to, a rule that the agency had no intention of changing in any 
manner throughout the notice-and-comment process.75 EPA, on the 
other hand, maintains that it was necessary to adopt an aggressive 
public education campaign during the rulemaking process to counter 
an aggressive misinformation campaign supported by the American 
Farm Bureau.76 In such circumstances, it may be difficult to know 
the true motivations for the agency’s social media campaign, but it 
seems reasonable to accept the agency’s defense of its efforts in light 
of (i) the need to provide accurate information to the public in order 
to obtain meaningful input on the impacts of the proposal and public 
reaction to the proposal, (ii) the agency’s duty under the National 
Environmental Education Act to improve awareness of environmen-
tal problems, and (iii) the agency’s duty under the Clean Water Act to 
encourage and assist citizen participation in the development of the 
WOTUS rule.77  
F.   Information Contouring  
 Just as an agency that enters the rulemaking process intent on 
minimizing changes to the rule during the rulemaking process may 
use social media to build public support for the rule through the 
rulemaking process, it may use social media to build a record to 
support the rule through the rulemaking process. An agency that 
enters the rulemaking process with an open mind will use the pro-
                                                                                                                  
 75. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7; Jennevieve Fong, EPA Chief Down-
plays ‘Covert Propaganda’, THE HILL (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:48 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/ 
energy-environment/269167-epa-chief-downplays-covert-propaganda [https://perma.cc/X5C6-
SULC]; Obama Administration is Intentionally Misleading Americans on Proposed Water Rule, 
SENATE W. CAUCUS (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/10/ 
obama-administration-is-intentionally-misleading-americans-on-proposed-water-rule [https:// 
perma.cc/42SR-KWH8] [hereinafter Letter from 24 U.S. Senators]. 
 76. See Fong, supra note 75; Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7; EPA’s McCar-
thy: Ditch the Myths, Not the Waters of the U.S. Rule, FARM FUTURES (July 9, 2014), 
http://farmfutures.farmcentric.com/story-epas-mccarthy-ditch-myths-waters-rule-0-114845 
[https://perma.cc/29TS-V5GZ]; see also infra Part II.C. EPA’s use of social media to counter 
the Farm Bureau’s anti-regulatory campaign is part of a broader strategy by the White 
House and its newly created Office of Digital Strategy to use social media to educate the 
public and respond to criticism. See Eric Lipton & Michael D. Shear, E.P.A. Broke Law 
With Social Media Push for Water Rule, Auditor Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/us/politics/epa-broke-the-law-by-using-social-media-
to-push-water-rule-auditor-finds.html [https://perma.cc/7DFQ-QSLE]. 
 77. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. In its social media policy, EPA 
notes that “[i]t is [the agency’s] policy to use social media where appropriate in order to 
meet its mission of protecting human health and the environment.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 2.  
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cess to gather information, while an agency that enters the rule-
making process intent on reaching a predetermined outcome may 
use the process to contour information.  
 Although rules developed by agencies do not need to be supported 
by a formal administrative record, courts will strike down rules that 
are arbitrary and capricious.78 Although the standard is deferential, 
courts will not uphold agency rules based on naked assertions of 
agency expertise.79 Instead, agencies must support their rules with 
reasonable explanations.80 While rules developed through informal 
rulemaking are not reviewed ‘on the record,’ courts frequently exam-
ine the information that agencies receive through the notice-and-
comment process when determining whether an agency’s rules are 
reasonable.81 Courts often strike down agency rules when agencies 
fail to adequately address issues raised during the rulemaking pro-
cess.82 Since judicial review of agencies’ rules frequently focuses on the 
information provided to agencies in the notice-and-comment process, 
agencies that enter the rulemaking process intent on reaching a prede-
termined outcome have an incentive to build a record of public input 
that supports that outcome. Those agencies could decide to use social 
media to prompt appropriate members of the public to provide input in 
the rulemaking process that supports the agencies’ desired outcome.  
 Just as there is a fine line between education and evangelization, 
there is a fine line between information gathering and information 
contouring. Agencies can appropriately seek to gather information to 
fortify the ultimate factual, legal, and policy decisions that they make 
in the rulemaking process against judicial attack, as long as they re-
main open to being transformed by the information that they receive 
                                                                                                                  
 78. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  
 79. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 
925 (D. Or. 2016); Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Salazar, No. SACV 11-01263-JVS (ANx), 
2012 WL 5353353, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012); N. Spotted Owl (Strix Occidentalis 
Caurina) v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988).  
 80. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 479 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
 81. The APA requires agencies to provide a “concise general statement of [the] basis 
and purpose” of their rules when they publish them as final rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
The statement should allow courts “to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by 
the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.” Home Box Office, 
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. 
Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). 
 82. See, e.g., Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1566, 1569 (11th 
Cir. 1985); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); Action on 
Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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through the notice-and-comment process.83 Agencies should not, how-
ever, seek to cultivate information submission that supports a de-
sired outcome if the agencies have determined that they do not in-
tend to, or need to, consider information that supports alternative 
approaches.84 As with education and evangelization, it is often diffi-
cult to discern an agency’s intent to engage in information contouring 
as opposed to information gathering.  
III.   ERULEMAKING AND SOCIAL MEDIA  
A.   First Generation eRulemaking Efforts  
 Agency experimentation with social media tools in the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process is an outgrowth of broader agency ef-
forts to utilize technology to transform the process to achieve the 
goals outlined in the preceding section.85 Early agency eRulemaking 
efforts have not, however, transformed the process.86  
 The E-Government Act of 200287 required agencies to accept com-
ments on notice-and-comment rulemaking electronically88 and to cre-
ate electronic dockets for rulemakings, which are publicly accessible 
on the Internet through a Federal government website.89 Congress’ 
goal in the statute was to increase citizen participation in govern-
ment, improve decisionmaking by government decisionmakers, and 
make the government more transparent and accountable.90 While 
supporters of eRulemaking noted that technology could be used to 
                                                                                                                  
 83. On several occasions, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that an agency’s rule can be inval-
idated if the agency does not review public comments with an open mind. See infra Part V.  
 84. See infra Part V. Agencies must be wary, though, of the unintended consequences 
of broad social media campaigns. An effort to use social media to cultivate information 
submission may be viewed with hostility by opponents of the agency’s rule and generate a 
groundswell of negative comments from those opponents. See infra notes 248-51 and ac-
companying text. The agency must respond to all of those negative comments in a rational 
manner when finalizing its rule or risk having the rule invalidated either because the 
agency failed to provide a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of the rule, or 
because the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously. See infra Part V.  
 85. Some academics forecast an eRulemaking revolution that would make rulemaking 
“more broadly participatory, democratic, and dialogic.” See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2. At a 
minimum, the technologically enhanced process would be more efficient. Id. at 6.  
 86. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270. 
 87. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
 88. Id. § 206(c), 116 Stat. at 2916. 
 89. Id. § 206(d), 116 Stat. at 2916. The Office of Management and Budget, which was 
obligated to implement eRulemaking under the law, delegated that authority to EPA’s 
Office of Environmental Information. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 
5, at 91, 91 n.80. Regulations.gov is the website that the federal government launched to 
carry out its obligations under the law. Id. at 91.  
 90. § 2(b), 116 Stat. at 2900-01.  
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host public meetings online or to use social media, blogs, and other 
web applications to promote public awareness of and participation in 
regulatory proceedings, and hoped that it could make the process 
more dialogic, most of the early eRulemaking efforts simply involved 
moving the paper process of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
online.91 
 However, the early efforts ultimately did provide some of the ben-
efits that supporters predicted. By making the rules, the rulemaking 
process, and the information that agencies rely upon in developing 
rules available online, eRulemaking has helped increase public 
awareness about rules and educate the public about the rules that 
agencies are developing, as well as the rulemaking process.92 The in-
creased public awareness and education has led to greater transpar-
ency in the rulemaking process and a more democratic process. By 
making the public comments accessible online, eRulemaking has 
made it easier for persons to find, read, and respond to the com-
ments.93 This provides agencies with broader information, which 
should lead to better decisionmaking and better rules.  
 In spite of these benefits, critics argue that the nature of the no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking process has not been changed by 
eRulemaking.94 Early eRulemaking efforts have not significantly in-
creased public participation in rulemaking95 and have not improved 
the quality of input from the public96 or generated ‘situational 
knowledge’ from persons who failed to participate in the traditional 
notice-and-comment process.97 Instead, critics note, in some proceed-
ings, the technological reforms have spurred submission of hundreds 
of thousands of duplicate public comments orchestrated by interest 
groups, transforming notice-and-comment rulemaking into “notice 
and spam” rulemaking.98 Those comments frequently simply articu-
late broad support for or opposition to the rule and are given less 
                                                                                                                  
 91. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 92. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 93.  
 94. See Balla & Daniels, supra note 24, at 48; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 387; 
Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 81.  
 95. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 8; Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 707; John-
son, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 93-94. 
 96. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 8; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, 
at 94-95. 
 97. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 8. Herz notes that public commenters frequently “fail 
to provide the things that agency staff most need: concrete examples, specific alternatives 
to the proposal, an awareness of statutory limitations, hard data to back up conclusions, 
and direct responses to any specific questions the agency may have asked.” Id.  
 98. Id. at 9 (quoting BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKIGOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY 
CAN MAKE GOVERNMENT BETTER 138 (2009)). 
1396  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1379 
 
weight than the lengthy, well-researched, and narrowly focused 
comments of the regulated entities and trade associations.99 Further, 
critics note that regulated entities and other traditional repeat play-
ers in the notice-and-comment process continue to submit their com-
ments at the close of the comment period, negating any possibility of 
a dialogue in the comment period.100 
B.   Rulemaking 2.0 and Support for Social Media in Rulemaking 2.0  
 While first generation eRulemaking efforts have fallen short of 
expectations thus far, reformers argue that a new generation of the 
Internet, Web 2.0, and social media tools could change the nature of 
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process to achieve many of the 
goals outlined above. Until recently, the Web was a place where or-
ganizations or people created static, text-based sites to make infor-
mation broadly and easily retrievable.101 Developers of websites pro-
vided and controlled the content of the sites, and there was very little 
interaction between the website owner and users or among the web-
site users.102 Over time, though, the Internet transformed. Primitive 
discussion boards were replaced by blogs.103 Social networking ser-
vices, such as Facebook, were created.104 Media sharing sites, such as 
YouTube, were launched, as were applications designed to facilitate 
collaboration, such as Google Docs and MediaWiki, the platform for 
Wikipedia.105 Unlike Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and social media tools are col-
laborative and allow users to produce and generate content rather 
than simply receive content.106 Websites in the Web 2.0 world tend 
toward dynamic, multi-media platforms with significant amounts of 
content created by users.107 It is for those reasons that reformers ar-
gue that a new generation of eRulemaking, Rulemaking 2.0, that in-
corporates social media could make the notice-and-comment process 
more dialogic and transparent, as well as increase public participa-
tion in the process and improve the nature of public comments.108  
                                                                                                                  
 99. Id. at 9-10. 
 100. Id. at 10. 
 101. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2, 11; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 393.  
 102. See sources cited supra note 101. 
 103. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 393. 
 104. Id. at 393-94. 
 105. Id. at 394. 
 106. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2-3, 11.  
 107. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 11; Jonathan A. Obar et al., Advocacy 2.0: An Analy-
sis of How Advocacy Groups in the United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools 
for Facilitating Civic Engagement and Collective Action, 2 J. INFO. POL’Y 1, 7-8 (2012).  
 108. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2-3, 11.  
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 EPA defines “social media” as “any online tool or application that 
goes beyond simply providing information, instead allowing collabo-
ration, interaction, and sharing.”109 According to the agency, “[t]he 
essential features of social media . . . include . . . the ability to sup-
port two-way social interactions in real time; the ability to allow cre-
ation and exchange of user-generated content . . .; and easy and low-
cost accessibility by large numbers of people without specialized 
skills or training.”110 Social media tools that might be used in notice-
and-comment rulemaking include social networking sites, like Face-
book, LinkedIn and Google+; blogs and microblogs, like Twitter or 
Thunderclap; file or photo sharing sites, like YouTube, Vine, Snap-
chat, Flickr, and Instagram; Wikis; and applications that allow users 
to vote or rank specific items, such as Reddit or Ideascale.111  
 ACUS has supported the expanded use of technology in notice-
and-comment rulemaking for more than two decades. As early as 
1995, the organization recommended that agencies should use elec-
tronic bulletin boards and other means of electronic communication 
to solicit public input on rules.112 In 2011, ACUS recommended that 
agencies consider using social media in appropriate rulemakings to 
raise the visibility of rulemakings.113 Two years later, ACUS adopted 
a series of recommendations that encourage agencies to use social 
media for a wide variety of purposes (beyond raising the visibility of 
rules) in the rulemaking process.114  
 The White House also strongly supports the expanded use of social 
media across agency functions. On his first day in office, President 
Obama issued a memorandum on transparency and open government 
that called on agencies to harness technology to put information 
online and to use innovative tools to collaborate and communicate 
                                                                                                                  
 109. Id. at 12 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note 
26, at 5); see also Obar et al., supra note 107, at 7 (providing an alternative definition of 
social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User 
Generated Content”) (quoting Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, 
Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS, no. 1, 2010, 
at 61); ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,269 (defining social media to 
include “any online tool that facilitates two-way communication, collaboration, interaction, 
or sharing between agencies and the public”). 
 110. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 12.  
 111. Id. at 11-12. 
 112. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 95-3: Re-
view of Existing Agency Regulations, § IV.A., 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,110 (Aug. 18, 1995) 
(adopted June 15, 1995; not published in the C.F.R.).  
 113. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-8: 
Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2264, 2265 (Jan. 17, 2012) 
(adopted Dec. 9, 2011; not published in the C.F.R.). 
 114. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270-72. 
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with the public.115 The eRulemaking Program Management Office, 
within the Executive Branch, subsequently endorsed the use of new 
tools, such as blogs, wikis, user generated feedback and ratings, vide-
os, and social media networks, “to promote and facilitate transparen-
cy, public engagement, and collaboration.”116 According to a 2013 re-
port for ACUS, there were almost 2000 government social media ac-
counts at that time, not counting blogs. At that time, EPA main-
tained thirty-five Twitter feeds and thirty-two Facebook pages from 
headquarters or regional offices, twelve blogs, a YouTube channel, a 
Flickr photostream, multiple discussion forums, a collection of pod-
casts, an RSS feed for its news releases, a wiki, a page on Four-
square, and even a page on Google+.117  
C.   Social Media Tools Used by EPA and the American Farm Bureau 
in the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rulemaking  
 In light of the strong Executive Branch support for the use of social 
media in rulemaking, it is not surprising that EPA recently employed 
a variety of social media tools to issue a rule to define the agency’s ju-
risdiction over “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) under the Fed-
eral Clean Water Act.118 To some extent, though, the breadth of the 
agency’s social media campaign was prompted by the social media 
campaign preemptively launched by opponents of the rule.  
 The agency anticipated that the rulemaking would be controver-
sial, because the statutory language being interpreted in the rule had 
been the subject of three Supreme Court decisions.119 At the time that 
EPA issued the notice of proposed rulemaking, the agency posted a 
YouTube video from Gina McCarthy, the agency’s Administrator, and 
several other agency officials, explaining the proposed rule and invit-
ing public input in the development of the rule.120 A day later, the 
                                                                                                                  
 115. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 116. See ERULEMAKING PROGRAM MGMT. OFFICE, IMPROVING ELECTRONIC DOCKETS ON 
REGULATIONS.GOV AND THE FEDERAL DOCKET MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: BEST PRACTICES FOR 
FEDERAL AGENCIES 8 (2010), https://www.regulations.gov/docs/FactSheet_eRulemaking_ 
Best_Practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYV6-T9M9].  
 117. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 16-18.  
 118. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054 (June 29, 2015).  
 119. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).  
 120. See EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Clarify Protection for Nation’s Streams 
and Wetlands: Agriculture’s Exemptions and Exclusions from Clean Water Act Ex-
panded by Proposal, EPA (Mar. 25, 2014), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ 
3881d73f4d4aaa0b85257359003f5348/ae90dedd9595a02485257ca600557e30 [https://perma.cc/ 
GGJ8-AKG3].  
2017]  SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING 1399 
 
agency released a summary of statements from various advocacy 
groups that were supporting the proposal.121 A few days after the 
proposed rule was released, the American Farm Bureau issued a 
press release criticizing the rule and calling on its members to urge 
EPA to “ditch the rule.”122 “The Farm Bureau was supported by home 
builders, the fertilizer and pesticides industries, oil and gas produc-
ers[,] and a national association of golf course owners . . . .”123 A week 
later, 213 members of Congress wrote to EPA, expressing “serious con-
cerns” with the rule and asking EPA to withdraw the rule.124 Shortly 
thereafter, the American Farm Bureau and local Farm Bureaus began 
a massive social media campaign to oppose the rule. The Missouri 
Farm Bureau posted a satirical video parodying the EPA rule to the 
tune of Disney’s Let It Go, which attracted over 100,000 views.125  
 In September 2014, the American Farm Bureau launched a “Ditch 
the Rule” website and began a Twitter campaign, urging followers to 
express their opposition to EPA using the hashtag #DitchTheRule.126 
In the campaign, the Farm Bureau incited farmers by claiming that 
EPA’s rule would regulate groundwater, puddles, and all ponds and 
ditches on farms.127 It claimed that the rule would require farmers to 
obtain a federal permit to pull weeds on their land and would give 
the agency veto authority over a farmer or rancher’s ability to oper-
ate.128 The Farm Bureau also asserted that EPA’s rule violated the 
limits imposed on the agency by the Supreme Court decisions and 
                                                                                                                  
 121. See Here’s What They’re Saying About the Clean Water Act Proposed Rule, EPA (Mar. 
26, 2014), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ec5b6cb1c087a2308525735900404445/ 
3f954c179cf0720985257ca7004920fa!OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/F6QE-FL4G].  
 122. American Farm Bureau Tells Members to ‘Ditch’ EPA Water Rule, AM. FARM 
BUREAU FED’N (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.fb.org/newsroom/american-farm-bureau-tells-
members-to-ditch-epa-water-rule [https://perma.cc/2VXH-2JZ7].  
 123. Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.  
 124. See Letter from Representative Chris Collins et al. to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r of the 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, & John McHugh, Sec’y of the Dep’t of the Army (May 1, 2014), 
https://chriscollins.house.gov/sites/chriscollins.house.gov/files/Clean%20Water%20Act% 
20Letter%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8DS-P8P8].  
 125. MO. FARM BUREAU, That’s Enough – (“Let it Go” Parody), YOUTUBE.COM (May 23, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0OqJqNbbs [https://perma.cc/N8RD-A5Y5].  
 126. See Nina Hart et al., Social Media: Changing the Landscape of Rulemaking, 30 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T, no. 1, Summer 2015, at 27, 28; Tell EPA to “Ditch the Rule”, AM. FARM 
BUREAU FED’N, http://fbvideos.org/ditch-the-rule/tell-epa-to-ditch-the-rule/3616580118001 
[https://perma.cc/XE82-F3DG] [hereinafter AM. FARM BUREAU, Ditch the Rule].  
 127. See AM. FARM BUREAU, Ditch the Rule, supra note 126.  
 128. See AM. FARM BUREAU, It’s Time to Ditch the Rule, INTERNET ARCHIVE WAYBACK 
MACHINE, http://web.archive.org/web/20160326231232/http://ditchtherule.fb.org/custom_page/ 
its-time-to-ditch-the-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6FKS-53CJ]; see also It’s Time to Ditch the 
Rule, HBA IOWA (Sept 4, 2014), http://hbaiowa.org/ditchtherule/iowa-water-ways/ 
[https://perma.cc/57BG-KWAT].  
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warned that everyone who depends on agriculture for food would suf-
fer because of the rule.129  
 In response to the aggressive social media campaign of the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau, EPA turned to social media to clarify the scope 
and details of the rule, to allay public concerns, and to hopefully im-
prove the quality of public comment on the proposal.130 In late Sep-
tember 2014, EPA began its social media outreach with a Thunder-
clap campaign to publicize the proposed rule.131 Thunderclap is a so-
cial media platform that “allows a single message” to be shared 
across multiple Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr accounts at the same 
time.132 The organizer of a Thunderclap campaign drafts a message of 
no more than 117 characters that will be shared with persons who 
sign up to support the campaign once the campaign is supported by a 
specific number of persons chosen by the organizer of the campaign 
(e.g., 500 supporters).133 For the WOTUS rule, “EPA created a Thun-
derclap campaign page titled, ‘I Choose Clean Water.’ ”134 The page 
was visibly attributed to EPA and, when EPA met its goal of 500 
supporters, the campaign posted the following message to the sup-
porters’ social media accounts: “Clean water is important to me. I 
support EPA’s efforts to protect it for my health, my family, and my 
community.”135 The message, which included a link to the EPA web 
page for the proposed rule, was posted on 980 social media accounts 
through the Thuderclap campaign, where it was viewed by about 1.8 
million followers and friends of those accounts.136  
 The agency also created its own Twitter hashtag, #DitchTheMyth, 
connected to YouTube videos and Facebook postings, that addressed the 
inaccuracies in the Farm Bureau’s #DitchTheRule campaign.137 The 
                                                                                                                  
 129. See sources cited supra note 128; Ditch the Rule – Answers, AM. FARM BUREAU, 
http://www.envirolawteachers.com/farm-bureau-answers.html [https://perma.cc/M5SD-TF85]; 
Ditch the Rule – Go Social, AM. FARM BUREAU, http://www.envirolawteachers.com/ 
farm-bureau-go-social.html [https://perma.cc/Z6BN-HD7F].  
 130. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 3; Hart et al., supra note 126, at 28-29; Lipton & 
Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.  
 131. See Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29; Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.  
 132. See What is Thunderclap?, THUNDERCLAP, https://help.thunderclap.it/hc/en-us/ 
articles/235482008-What-is-Thunderclap- [https://perma.cc/7HKK-WMTG].  
 133. See Getting Started, THUNDERCLAP, https://help.thunderclap.it/hc/en-us/sections/ 
207196828-Getting-Started [https://perma.cc/NPQ5-5PH4].  
 134. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 4.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 5; see also Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29. 
 137. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 5-6; Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.  
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Twitter campaign directed the public to EPA’s website, where the rule 
was explained and the public were invited to comment on the rule.138  
 In addition to the #DitchTheMyth campaign, the Communications 
Director for EPA’s Office of Water created an EPA blog post entitled 
Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules.139 The Communications Director 
urged followers to post a photo of themselves on Facebook, Twitter, or 
Instagram holding a #CleanWaterRules sign and explaining why 
clean water is important to them.140 As outlined in the next section, 
EPA’s social media efforts focused on educating the public, increasing 
public awareness that the rule was being developed, encouraging 
greater participation in the development of the rule, and encouraging 
public support for the rule.141 Critics argued, however, that the agen-
cy’s social media campaign violated federal anti-lobbying laws and 
demonstrated that the agency was not interested in receiving any 
public input that opposed the approach that the agency preferred to 
take in finalizing its rule.142  
IV.   EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MEDIA  
 As EPA and other agencies turn more frequently to social media 
in the rulemaking process, it is useful to examine whether those tools 
can effectively be used to achieve the purposes outlined earlier in this 
Article. While EPA’s use of social media in the WOTUS rulemaking 
provides one lens through which to examine those questions, this sec-
tion of the Article will not confine its focus to EPA’s efforts in that 
rulemaking. The Department of Transportation and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau have engaged in a more sophisticated 
and robust use of social media tools in conjunction with the Cornell 
                                                                                                                  
 138. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7; see also Ditch the Myth: Let’s Get 
Serious About Protecting Clean Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2014-07/documents/ditch_the_myth_wotus.pdf [https://perma.cc/994P-
UQDZ]. EPA’s website included a fact sheet that identified and corrected twenty-three 
misstatements regarding the agency’s proposed rule. See id. For instance, the document 
clarified that the proposed rule (1) reduced regulation of ditches, rather than expanded 
their regulation; (2) did not regulate groundwater; (3) was consistent with authority under 
the Supreme Court precedent; and (4) was based on a scientific assessment that was devel-
oped through review of more than 1000 peer reviewed and publicly available scientific 
studies. Id.  
 139. Travis Loop, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules,  
THE EPA BLOG, (Apr. 7, 2015) https://blog.epa.gov/blog/tag/clean-water-rules/ 
[https://perma.cc/9WDW-SKCM]; see also GAO Report, supra note 1, at 6-7.  
 140. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 6-7; Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29; Lip-
ton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7. The blog post was submitted by the Communi-
cations Director after the agency submitted the final rule to the Office of Management 
and Budget for review. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 21. 
 141. See infra Part III; see also GAO Report, supra note 1, at 3.  
 142. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.  
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eRulemaking Initiative as part of its experimental Regulation Room 
program,143 and other agencies are using social media tools in other 
ways in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Nevertheless, EPA’s use of 
social media tools in the WOTUS rulemaking exhibits some of the 
strengths and limitations of those tools, so this section of the Article 
will pay particular attention to the extent to which EPA was able to 
use those tools to increase public awareness, educate the public, gen-
erate broader participation, change the nature of participation, and 
generate support for the agency’s rule.  
A.   Increasing Public Awareness  
 To the extent that members of the public do not participate in the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process because they are not aware 
that the government is developing rules that would impact them or 
that the government is seeking their input, social media tools appear 
to be an effective way to overcome that barrier.144 As of December 31, 
2016, an average of more than 1 billion persons used Facebook every 
day and an average of more than 1.6 billion persons used it every 
month.145 Similarly, there were more than 313 million active users of 
Twitter as of June 30, 2016, and more than 1 billion unique visits per 
month to sites with embedded Tweets.146 Advocacy groups have al-
ready recognized the power of social networking to recruit members 
and to publicize the goals and activities of their organizations.147 In a 
recent survey of more than 100 advocacy groups, all of the organiza-
tions indicated that they used social media to interact with the pub-
lic.148 The groups understand that social networks increase the speed, 
reach, and effectiveness of their communication efforts.149  
 Social media advocates suggest that social networking serves a 
democratic function by empowering and connecting individuals and 
groups, and in so doing, moving persons toward civic engagement 
and collective action.150 Today, advocacy organizations focus more 
heavily on connecting people to their message through their friends 
                                                                                                                  
 143. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 144. “[T]elling the agency’s story” is perhaps the most obvious way that agencies can 
use social media in the rulemaking process, and it has been endorsed by the eRulemaking 
Program Office. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 29.  
 145. See Facebook, Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/ 
company-info [https://perma.cc/75J4-BJXV].  
 146. See Company Facts, TWITTER, http://about.twitter.com/company 
[https://perma.cc/36GU-3BW5].  
 147. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 13-14.  
 148. Id. at 11.  
 149. Id. at 4-5, 15.  
 150. Id. at 2-3.  
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and followers, rather than pushing a message out to the public en 
masse.151 They recognize that users living in online communities such 
as Facebook and Twitter are unlikely to venture out to an organiza-
tion website and interact with the organization unless a friend has 
already done so and promoted that action in the online community.152 
In the survey of advocacy groups mentioned above, Facebook and 
Twitter were the most popular social networking tools, and two-
thirds of the organizations reported using Facebook and Twitter eve-
ry day to communicate with the public.153  
 Agencies are beginning to learn the lessons that advocacy groups 
learned over the last decade. Agencies can take advantage of person-
to-person connections to spread the news about rules and the input 
they are seeking on the rules more broadly through social networks 
than they ever could through public meetings and legal notices.154 As 
Professor Michael Herz has noted, federal agencies are beginning to 
post notices regarding their proposed and final rules on their web-
sites, blogs, Twitter feeds, and Facebook pages, and even posting vid-
eos about rulemakings to many of those sites.155  
 ACUS has also concluded that social media tools can be very effective 
to increase public awareness of rules and of the opportunity to partici-
pate in the rulemaking process. In 2013, ACUS recommended that:  
Agencies should take an expansive approach to alerting potential 
participants to upcoming rulemakings by posting to the agency 
Web site and sending notifications through multiple social media 
channels[, since] [s]ocial media may provide an effective means to 
reach interested persons who have traditionally been underrepre-
sented in the rulemaking process (including holders of affected in-
terests that are highly diffused).156  
 Through its Thunderclap campaign for the WOTUS rule, EPA was 
able to take advantage of Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr to notify 
                                                                                                                  
 151. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 395.  
 152. Id.  
 153. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 12.  
 154. In some cases, social networking may open doors for person-to-person communica-
tion that were closed in the offline world. For instance, when the Cornell e-Rulemaking 
team was trying to use associations of pilots, flight attendants, ground crews, and travel 
agents to solicit input from the members of those associations for a proposed Department of 
Transportation rule regarding airline passenger rights, the associations refused to facili-
tate the involvement of their members. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 413. That expe-
rience reinforced the team’s belief that experts, as much if not more than other members of 
the public, “will be more responsive to information coming peer-to-peer than to information 
that comes from a source outside the expert community.” Id. at 414.  
 155. HERZ, supra note 18, at 30-31; see also Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, su-
pra note 5, at 105.  
 156. ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270-71. 
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almost 2 million people that the agency was developing a rule de-
signed to protect water quality and that the agency was seeking their 
input and support.157 That is a significantly greater number of per-
sons than the agency likely reached through the publication of the 
proposed rule in the Federal Register.158 In light of the fact that the 
agency ultimately received over 1 million public comments on the 
rule,159 it appears that the agency’s social networking efforts contrib-
uted to increased public awareness of the rule, regardless of whether 
they achieved any of the other goals outlined above for social media.  
B.   Educating the Public  
 While agencies have been using social media primarily to increase 
public awareness of their activities thus far, a public education goal 
is not far behind. As EPA did in the WOTUS rulemaking, agencies 
are increasingly creating YouTube videos, webinars, and fact sheets 
to explain the issues in proposed rules or to explain the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process, and linking to those resources through 
Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and other social media platforms.160 ACUS’ 
2013 recommendations urge agencies to use multiple social media 
channels to educate the public about rules and the rulemaking pro-
cess,161 and to create a blog or social media site for each rulemaking 
that provides information, updates, and clarifications regarding the 
rule.162 The recommendations also encourage agencies to create and 
post videos to social media about the rulemaking process and how to 
comment effectively in the process, and to hold webinars or online 
classes to demonstrate how to draft comments and to review draft 
comments and suggest ways to improve them.163  
 In addition, ACUS recommends that agencies create plain lan-
guage versions of their rules and simplified statements of issues that 
they can distribute through social media to solicit input from the 
                                                                                                                  
 157. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.  
 158. As Professor Herz notes, “[Q]uite simply, social media sites are the places in the 
virtual world where the most people can be found.” HERZ, supra note 18, at 14.  
 159. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.  
 160. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 19, 30-31; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra 
note 5, at 105. When EPA announced a proposed rule to limit greenhouse gas emissions 
from power plants, the agency produced a thirty-three-minute video that addressed green-
house gases, electricity generation, and the Clean Air Act to help citizens understand the 
issues involved in the rulemaking. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 30-31.  
 161. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270. 
 162. See id. at 76,271. 
 163. Id. Many agencies already provide guidance on drafting effective comments on 
their websites, but the ACUS recommendations envision more robust and interactive pro-
grams that take advantage of the powers of social media. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 46.  
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public.164 Most agencies have not yet adopted that approach, which is 
time and resource intensive, but the Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative 
(CeRI) pioneered it and regularly uses it in the rules in its Regulation 
Room program.165 When the faculty and students on the Regulation 
Room team work with a federal agency on a rulemaking, they create 
a plain language version of the rule and divide the rule into concep-
tually coherent issues that are posted on the Regulation Room web-
site for the rule.166 The team provides moderators to answer ques-
tions regarding the proposal and to provide feedback regarding the 
effectiveness of comments drafted by visitors to the site.167 While 
comments submitted in the Regulation Room are not official com-
ments, the Regulation Room team submits a summary of all the 
comments to the agency sponsoring the rulemaking during the com-
ment period for the rule.168 
 While social media can, therefore, play an important educational 
role in the rulemaking process, there are important limitations to its 
effectiveness. First, educational materials produced by agencies and 
provided through social media can only be effective if members of the 
public actually read and engage with the materials. However, studies 
suggest that readers do not pay close attention to most material that 
they read online.169 While many Americans report using the web, ra-
ther than conventional media, as their primary news source, a 2010 
Pew Research survey found that “the average visit to an online news 
site lasts [about] three minutes.”170 Most web users briefly scan a web 
page and click on the first link that interests them.171 One social me-
dia expert recently estimated that 64 percent of web pages are never 
even scrolled “below the fold” of the monitor screen.172 The nature of 
the interaction between social media sites and users is not conducive 
to deep reflection or contemplation. 
                                                                                                                  
 164. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.  
 165. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 390-91, 437-39. CeRI has worked with the De-
partment of Transportation and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to solicit public 
input on six rules in the Regulation Room Program. See CeRI, Regulation Room, 
http://regulationroom.org [https://perma.cc/H8VA-4KKB].  
 166. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 438. The plain language versions are linked to 
the full text of the rule, impact analyses, and other legal and scientific documents associat-
ed with the rule. Id.  
 167. Id. at 438-39; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 46; Johnson, Beyond the Usual 
Suspects, supra note 5, at 107-08.  
 168. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 108.  
 169. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 440.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
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 In light of the realities of the interaction between users and social 
networking sites, social media encourages simplification of infor-
mation. Unfortunately, 140 character Tweets, single sentence or single 
paragraph Facebook posts, or 6 second Vine videos are imperfect vehi-
cles for explaining the intricacies of rules or the accompanying scien-
tific and economic analyses that are frequently drafted at graduate 
school reading levels. Something is bound to get lost in the translation.  
 Further, even when the information can be distilled into manage-
able and accessible formats that can be distributed through social 
media, it tends to be a bit dry and unlikely to go viral. In a recent ar-
ticle, Professor Herz described how a short video on the rulemaking 
process that won a White House competition attracted fewer than 700 
views on YouTube, while videos produced by a conservative anti-
regulatory organization to parody the winning video were “viewed tens 
of thousands of times.”173 He notes that content must be “really inter-
esting, funny, or edgy” to go viral.174 Educational materials produced 
by agencies are unlikely to be “really interesting, funny, or edgy.”175 
 Despite those limitations, social networks can still serve as valua-
ble vehicles to deliver educational materials. Although there are 
space limits on Tweets, Facebook posts, blog posts, and other social 
networking platforms, it is not necessary to include the entirety of 
one’s message in a social media post. Tweets, Facebook posts, blog 
posts, and other social media posts frequently include embedded 
links, so agencies may spread the word about videos, webinars, fact 
sheets, and other educational materials and websites through those 
links.176 That is precisely what EPA did in the WOTUS rulemaking 
through its #DitchTheMyth campaign and Thunderclap campaign.177 
In both cases, the agency linked its communications to a website that 
provided educational materials regarding the rule.178 EPA’s #Clean-
WaterRules blog post also linked to EPA websites and external web-
sites regarding the rule and clean water, although the blog entry was 
posted after the public comment period for the rule was closed.179  
                                                                                                                  
 173. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 34-35.  
 174. Id. at 35.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Advocacy organizations have understood that for a decade or more and, in the 
survey outlined earlier in this Article, most organizations identified Facebook and Twitter 
as the preferred vehicles for education. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 12-13, 18-19. 
Surprisingly, the organizations surveyed ranked YouTube as the least effective social me-
dia tool for education. Id. at 19.  
 177. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.  
 178. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text. 
 179. The entry was posted on the blog when the agency submitted its final rule to the 
Office of Management and Budget for review prior to publication, so the campaign was clearly 
not targeted to educate the public as a means of facilitating broader input into the develop-
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 It was incumbent on EPA to engage in a broad social media cam-
paign to educate the public on the WOTUS rule for two reasons. First, 
the rule was exceedingly complex and was posted to Regulations.gov 
with 283 supporting documents, including an 82 page economic analy-
sis of the rule and a connectivity study that reviewed and synthesized 
1200 publications from peer reviewed scientific literature.180 Second, 
opponents of the rule were aggressively using social media to distrib-
ute false and inaccurate information about the rule.181 It was im-
portant, therefore, for the agency to use the same platforms to rebut 
the information that opponents were using to distribute it.  
C.   Generating Broader Participation and Better Comments  
 Advocates argue that social media tools provide a vehicle to reach 
out to persons who have frequently been left out of the rulemaking 
process, including minority communities,182 and to solicit information 
that is essential to the development of the rule from persons who 
have access to that information.183 Although social media tools may 
be effective for increasing public awareness about rules and the 
rulemaking process and may have some value for educating the pub-
lic about rules and the rulemaking process, they have not yet proven 
to be very useful for attracting those new participants to the process 
or improving the quality of the comments provided in the process.184 
The limited success may be due to the fact that most citizens, includ-
ing teens and younger adults who are more likely to be engaged with 
                                                                                                                  
ment of the rule. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 21. Instead, EPA approached the cam-
paign with more general educational goals. As noted in Part IV.E., critics may question 
whether the agency’s motivation for the #CleanWaterRules campaign was educational at all.  
 180. See U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880, DEFINITION OF “WATERS 
OF THE UNITED STATES” UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT, https://www.regulations.gov/ 
docket?D=EPA-HQ-QW-2011-0880.  
 181. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.  
 182. A 2010 report on “Government Online” prepared by the Pew Research Center found 
that African Americans and Latinos were using social media considerably more than Cauca-
sians and were significantly more likely to find government social media helpful and informa-
tive. See AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., GOVERNMENT ONLINE 6 (2010), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Government_Online_2010_ 
with_topline.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5YJ-FDV3]; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 434. At the 
same time, though, to the extent that there may still be a “digital divide,” where some so-
cio-economic groups lack access to the Internet, relying on the web as a participation tool 
exacerbates that inequity. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 96.  
 183. See supra Part I.C. In the survey of advocacy organizations described earlier in 
this Article, almost all of the organizations felt that social media tools are effective in facili-
tating collective action and civic engagement, and most organizations indicated that they 
use those tools every day. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 18. For purposes of mobilizing 
citizens and submitting citizens’ comments to government, the advocacy organizations 
ranked Facebook and listserves as the best tools, followed closely by Twitter. Id. at 13.  
 184. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 20-24.  
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social media,185 are not interested in participating in the process even 
if they know it is going on and have been educated about the process 
and the issues involved in the rulemaking.186 Social media has not 
significantly increased citizen interaction with government agencies 
outside of the rulemaking context, so the lack of participation in 
rulemaking may simply be an extension of that phenomenon.187  
 To some extent, though, the limited success may be due to the fact 
that agencies have not utilized the tools in an optimal manner. In 
order to attract new participants to the rulemaking process and re-
ceive better comments from the public, agencies must be diligent in 
developing a plan to reach those persons using traditional tools and 
social media and in encouraging them to participate in the process 
and provide more effective input. 
 ACUS addressed this issue in 2013 when it recommended that 
agencies develop communications plans for rules using tools specifi-
cally tailored to the rule and to all types of stakeholders or partici-
pants that the agency is trying to engage, and to target those com-
munications in an evenhanded manner that encourages all types of 
stakeholders to participate.188 Critics would likely argue that while 
EPA’s social media campaign for the WOTUS rulemaking was tai-
lored to attract particular types of participants, it did not encourage 
all types of stakeholders to participate.189 In another 2013 recom-
mendation, ACUS noted the value of using multilingual social media 
outlets to reach underrepresented groups and stressed the im-
portance of creating a social media message that clearly and specifi-
cally identifies how a proposed rule would target participants and 
what information would be most useful to the agency.190 Here again, 
                                                                                                                  
 185. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 435.  
 186. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 435-36 (speculating that most issues in federal 
rulemaking are likely to have little interest for younger adults); Johnson, Beyond the Usu-
al Suspects, supra note 5, at 115. In the advocacy organization survey, a number of partici-
pants suggested that generational and digital literacy gaps prevent social media from be-
ing a more effective civic engagement tool. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 16-17. Alt-
hough most rulemakings attract significantly more comments from regulated entities and 
interest groups than from the general public, there are exceptions. For instance, in a recent 
National Highway Transportation Administration rulemaking addressing vehicle-to-
vehicle communications, 94 percent of the comments were submitted by members of the 
general public. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 714.  
 187. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 20-21.  
 188. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.  
 189. The Thunderclap campaign seemed to very broadly target persons who would 
support the agency’s rule and enlisted them to spread the word about the rule to their 
friends and followers on social media. While the #DitchTheMyth campaign was designed to 
target an audience of supporters and opponents, it would be difficult to argue that the 
agency was trying to solicit more informed comments from opponents of the rule through 
that campaign.  
 190. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.  
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critics would likely suggest that EPA’s social media messaging did 
not clearly identify the type of information that would be most useful 
to the agency in the rulemaking process.191 Consequently, while the 
WOTUS rulemaking generated over a million public comments, most 
of the comments provided by ‘new voices’ simply expressed general 
support or opposition to the rule, and the agency’s use of social media 
did not unearth significant amounts of ‘localized knowledge.’192  
 The Regulation Room Program administered by the Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative provides an example of the outreach ap-
proach envisioned by ACUS. When CeRI was working with the De-
partment of Transportation on a rule that would ban texting while 
driving by commercial vehicle drivers, they identified six groups that 
might have an interest in the proposed rule, and developed targeted 
messaging for those groups using traditional media, phone calls, e-
mails, and social network posting.193 They adopted a proactive and 
reactive approach, monitoring social networks and posting responses 
to persons who posted comments or questions about the rule.194 They 
adopted a similar approach when working with the agency on an air-
line passenger rights rule.195 As a result of the planning and targeted 
outreach, 90 percent of the persons who participated in the Regula-
tion Room program indicated that they had never participated in no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking before.196 Despite that success, only a 
small percentage of the traffic to the Regulation Room rulemaking 
site came from Facebook or Twitter.197  
 The Regulation Room experiment demonstrates the importance of 
combining social media with traditional outreach tools, identifying 
appropriate social media groups to reach targeted audiences, and be-
ing diligent in monitoring and replying to social network postings.198 
All of that is very time consuming, and few agencies have expended 
                                                                                                                  
 191. EPA simply directed commenters to the agency’s web page for the rule and en-
couraged commenters to provide input on the range of issues covered in the rule.  
 192. See Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29. Many commenters criticized EPA for failing to 
proactively seek out input from stakeholders, including state and local officials. Id. at 29-30.  
 193. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 396-97.  
 194. Id. at 398-399. Using a social network monitoring tool, the Regulation Room team 
found almost 100 blogs about the rulemaking and posted comments to those blogs, inviting 
persons to participate in the rulemaking through the Regulation Room program. Id.  
 195. Id. at 403-04.  
 196. Id. at 392-93.  
 197. Id. at 411. In the airline passenger rights rulemaking, only 4.5 percent of the vis-
its to the Regulation Room website came from Facebook or Twitter. Id. However, the poten-
tial power of social media in the rulemaking process was demonstrated by the fact that 44 
percent of the traffic pertaining to one issue in the rulemaking, peanut allergies, originated 
from Facebook. Id. at 411-12. 
 198. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32.  
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the time and resources to target that input. Consequently, in the cas-
es where social media efforts, and e-rulemaking in general, have in-
creased public participation in rulemaking, they have merely in-
creased the quantity of participation, but have not connected agen-
cies to the localized knowledge and expertise which would be most 
helpful to agencies in the rulemaking process.199 It has not been un-
common in the e-rulemaking era for regulated entities and interest 
groups to spearhead mass e-mail comment campaigns that generate 
thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of comments on high profile 
rules.200 In the WOTUS rulemaking, for instance, several organiza-
tions sponsored comment submission campaigns that generated tens 
of thousands of comments each.201 Agencies must devote significant 
time and resources to reviewing the comments, which are frequently 
duplicative or nearly duplicative and often simply express support for 
or opposition to the rule, or a portion of the rule, without providing 
any useful data, expertise, or localized knowledge.202  
                                                                                                                  
 199. The extent to which ‘localized knowledge’ will be helpful to agencies will vary, 
depending upon the nature of the rulemaking. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 427-28; 
Reiss, supra note 70, at 344. Such input will, however, almost always be more helpful than 
the input of members of the public who are generally interested in a rule, but have no spe-
cialized expertise or knowledge to offer in comments. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 22. 
ACUS has recognized that “both the quality of comments and the level of participation in 
social media discussions are often much lower than one might hope.” ACUS Recommenda-
tion 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270. In the NHTSA vehicle to vehicle rulemaking men-
tioned above, although a significant majority of the comments came from the general pub-
lic, comments from advocacy organizations averaged 133 pages and comments from manu-
facturers or industry averaged 32 pages, but 90 percent of the comments from the general 
public were less than one page long. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 715.  
 200. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 416-17; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, 
supra note 5, at 95-96; Obar et al., supra note 107, at 6; Stuart W. Shulman, The Case 
Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. 
Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23 (2009) [hereinafter Shulman, Perverse Incen-
tives]; Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably Won’t) Change Every-
thing, 1 I/S 111 (2005); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Cam-
paigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-GOV’T 41 (2006).  
 201. See Stephen M. Johnson, WOTUS Rulemaking – Mass Comments, http:// 
www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/WOTUS rule mass comments.html [https://perma.cc/2KQK-6M3J] 
[hereinafter Johnson, Mass Comments]. Of the 1,127,925 comments that were posted on 
Regulations.gov for the WOTUS rulemaking as of June 10, 2016, only 20,592 (less than 2 
percent of the total) were unique comments. Id. A search of the comments posted on the 
site revealed that eighteen organizations promoted comment campaigns via the web, e-
mail, or postcards that generated more than 10,000 comments each. Id. The ten largest 
mass comment campaigns generated 844,951 submissions, or 75 percent, of the 1,127,925 
comments received by EPA. Id. Environment America organized a campaign that contrib-
uted 218,542 duplicate comments and the Natural Resources Defense Council organized a 
campaign that contributed 108,076 duplicate comments. Id.  
 202. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 25-26; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 416-17; John-
son, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 95-96, 112. Professor Herz notes that an 
agency would need to expend 700 staff hours to review 250,000 comments from a mass e-
mail campaign, even if the agency spent less than ten seconds reviewing each comment to 
ensure that it was merely duplicative. HERZ, supra note 18, at 26 (quoting Bridget C.E. 
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 It is not surprising that social media tools have not yet produced 
an outpouring of useful data, expertise, and localized knowledge from 
commenters, as the nature of social media is not conducive to the de-
velopment of that type of public input. As noted earlier, users spend 
little time on Facebook or other social networks reading or engaging 
in the type of deep thought necessary to develop comments on pro-
posed rules.203 Social networks facilitate the distribution of content, 
but they do not necessarily make the production of content easier.204 
Thus, social networks do little to make it easier for citizens to write 
effective comments.205 In addition, to the extent that social media 
tools do facilitate creation of content, the content is generally videos, 
photos, and mashups.206 That is not necessarily the type of content 
that is optimal for rulemaking comments.207  
 There are other reasons why social media tools do not encourage 
the development of the type of public input that is most helpful to 
agencies. Social network users spend a lot of time liking, ranking, 
and sharing preferences.208 Voting is a powerful tool to engage users 
in online communities.209 Consequently, when commenting on pro-
posed rules, social networkers are more likely to express general 
support for, or opposition to, a rule or a part of a rule than they are 
to engage in a critical analysis of the rule or provide data or exper-
tise to support their position. However, rulemaking is not a plebi-
scite, so agencies normally will not materially alter rules in the 
rulemaking process simply because a majority of commenters sup-
port or oppose a particular approach.210 Consequently, in many cas-
es, general expressions of support for a rule are not particularly 
helpful comments for an agency.211 Commenters who do not realize 
that legal and policy barriers may prevent the agency from adopting 
an approach in a rule that a majority of commenters support may 
                                                                                                                  
Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 893, 901 (2011)). Consequently, 
researchers are exploring automated tools to review such comments. Id. at 25. 
 203. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 
25-26.  
 204. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 24.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id.  
 208. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 441-42. 
 209. See id. at 443-44. 
 210. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 26. 
 211. Nevertheless, in defending the agency’s final WOTUS rule against critics, the EPA 
Administrator stressed that almost 90 percent of commenters supported the approach the 
agency took in the final rule. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7. 
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become disillusioned with the rulemaking process and feel that the 
agency is ignoring their input.212  
 Finally, in the Web 2.0 world, users also spend a lot of time engag-
ing in “flaming,” “troll[ing],” and other forms of “uncivil discourse.”213 
When those traits carry over into public commenting on a rule, it 
does not improve the quality of comments on the rule.214  
 Even though social media tools may not ultimately increase the 
quality of public comments, there may be some value in increasing 
the quantity of public comments on rules. For some rules, knowing 
public sentiment toward a particular approach that the agency is 
considering in a rule may help the agency develop a better and more 
effective rule.215 For instance, when an agency is developing a rule 
designed to provide consumers with information on a label or to solic-
it information from the regulated community on a form, the agency 
will likely be able to develop a more effective form or label once it 
knows how consumers or the regulated community are likely to react 
to various versions of the form or label.216 In light of that, while 
ACUS counsels that rulemakings are not generally enhanced by 
crowdsourcing, it recommends that “when the issue to be addressed 
[in a rulemaking] is the public or user response itself . . ., direct sub-
mission to the public at large may lead to useful information.”217  
 For other rules, even if the level of public support for or against an 
approach considered in a proposed rule may not help the agency de-
velop a better rule, it may provide the agency with valuable infor-
mation regarding whether the regulated community is likely to chal-
lenge that approach, whether it will be difficult to enforce that ap-
proach, and whether Congress will likely oppose that approach when 
                                                                                                                  
 212. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 27; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 
5, at 96, 114; see also ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270. 
 213. Farina et al., supra note 23, at 447; HERZ, supra note 18, at 24. 
 214. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 24. However, Professor Cynthia Farina and her col-
leagues suggest that online disinhibition can allow for “a more open and direct exchange of 
ideas, especially unpopular ones.” Farina et al., supra note 23, at 450-51. 
 215. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 428-29; Reiss, supra note 70, at 344.  
 216. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 428-29 (discussing how DOT used information 
about existing tire labeling requirements and consumer tire purchasing behavior in con-
junction with preferences expressed by consumers toward a variety of tire labeling options 
in the rulemaking process to develop a label to provide information to consumers regarding 
how tire purchasing choices affect fuel economy).  
 217. ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271. In many other situa-
tions, the type of input provided through social media is not helpful for rulemaking. In his 
report to ACUS that formed the basis for ACUS’ recommendations, Professor Herz sug-
gests that “[r]ulemakings that primarily involve questions of statutory interpretation, 
technical knowledge, or scientific expertise may be poorly suited to the kinds of responses 
usually produced by social media.” HERZ, supra note 18, at 28.  
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the rule is finalized.218 Although rulemaking is not a plebiscite, agen-
cies have limited enforcement and litigation resources. In cases 
where they have discretion to choose between one regulatory ap-
proach that is likely to be vigorously challenged and another that can 
be enforced more readily, they may choose to adopt the less contro-
versial approach if they appreciate the depth of opposition to the con-
troversial approach and there are not strong policy reasons for adopt-
ing the other approach despite the likelihood of the challenge.219  
 Finally, as noted above, broad public participation, which can be 
demonstrated by a significant increase in the quantity of public 
comments on a rulemaking, can legitimize agency decisionmaking 
and increase public confidence in, and acceptance of, agency rules. 220 
However, since citizen support for agency rules may be eroded when 
an agency adopts an approach that is at odds with the approach pre-
ferred by a majority of the public participants in the rulemaking pro-
cess,221 ACUS recommends that agencies explain to the public how 
the agency plans to use input generated from voting or ranking tools 
if the agency uses such tools.222 
D.   Changing the Nature of Public Participation 
 Just as social media tools have been largely ineffective for gen-
erating broader public participation in the rulemaking process and 
better public comments, they have also been ineffective for chang-
ing the nature of public participation in the process. Despite the 
hopes of supporters,223 social media tools have not opened up a dia-
logue between agencies and the public or between commenters dur-
ing the rulemaking process.224 This should not be surprising, since 
                                                                                                                  
 218. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 429-30; Reiss, supra note 70, at 344-45.  
 219. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 429 (discussing the prioritization of regulatory 
interventions in DOT’s airline passengers’ rights rulemaking based on the level of concern 
expressed in the rulemaking process toward various regulatory interventions). Information 
about public preferences may be valuable to an agency even if the agency does not choose 
to change a rule in any meaningful way in response to that information, simply because it 
provides the agency with more information about public concerns that may be useful to the 
agency in future rulemakings. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 709.  
 220. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; see also Reiss, supra note 70, at 
344-45.  
 221. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 85-86, 96. 
 222. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.  
 223. See, e.g., HERZ, supra note 18, at 14-15, 47; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 422. 
Advocacy groups also praise social media tools as a means of facilitating conversations with 
citizens, allowing them to adapt their message and strategies in response to those interac-
tions. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 15.  
 224. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 49. Professor Herz notes, though, that a transfor-
mation in the nature of the dialogue may not provide significant benefits to agencies, since 
“the informational challenges involved in rulemaking do not lend themselves to elucidation 
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the predominant currencies of social networking—liking, ranking, 
and voting—are not conducive to stimulating a deeper dialogue or 
exchange of views.225 In addition, the prevalence of flaming, 
trolling, and uncivil dialogue online provide significant barriers to 
improved dialogue between agencies and the public or between 
commenters during the rulemaking process.226  
 The CeRI Regulation Room Program demonstrates the potential for 
social networking to change the nature of the dialogue in the rulemak-
ing process, as threaded commenting could be a useful tool to facilitate 
greater interaction between agencies and the public or between com-
menters during the process.227 Along those lines, ACUS has recom-
mended that agencies consider using blogs to generate a dialogue 
about rules.228 However, the CeRI project is successful because it in-
volves human intervention and moderation,229 and ACUS has recom-
mended that agencies consider the use of facilitators “to manage rule-
making discussions conducted through social media.”230 Employing 
moderators and facilitators to manage the social media dialogue may 
be too time consuming and resource intensive for most rulemakings.231 
It is difficult to conceive how agencies would change the nature of the 
dialogue in the rulemaking process to increase the interaction between 
the agencies and the public and between commenters during the pro-
cess without expending considerable additional resources.  
 Even if agencies had the resources to provide facilitators or mod-
erators for blogs and social networking dialogues for every rulemak-
ing, it is unlikely that they would expend those resources to change 
the nature of the dialogue in the rulemaking process. Like many 
agencies, EPA has adopted guidelines to discourage its employees 
from responding to social media postings except in certain circum-
                                                                                                                  
by broad lay commentary” and because most issues in rulemaking do not lend themselves 
to “crowdsourcing.” Id. at 57.  
 225. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 26; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 440-45. 
 226. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 447-51. 
 227. See id. at 421; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 49-50; Johnson, Beyond the Usual 
Suspects, supra note 5, at 106. 
 228. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.  
 229. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 422; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 50; John-
son, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 107-08. 
 230. ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.  
 231. Id. at 76,270. EPA’s social media policy requires the agency to review comments 
that are going to be posted to social networks used by the agency before the comments are 
posted, if the network allows such moderation. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL 
MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 2. If the comments cannot be reviewed before they are 
posted, the policy requires agency representatives to review the comments, and possibly 
remove them, as soon as possible during business hours after they are posted. See U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 63, at 4. 
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stances, and to limit the content of the responses.232 Every comment 
made by a representative of the agency on social media may have rel-
evance in challenges to the rules ultimately adopted by the agency 
and may open up additional avenues for opponents to challenge the 
rule.233 Consequently, agencies are unlikely to be interested in engag-
ing in extensive dialogues with the public during the rulemaking pro-
cess through social media.  
E.   Generating Public Support for Agency Rules  
 While it does not appear that social media tools have been particu-
larly helpful in changing the nature of the dialogue in rulemaking, 
broadening participation, or improving the quality of comments, they 
hold some promise for educating the public and increasing public 
awareness of rulemaking. Their greatest strength, though, may be in 
generating public support for agency rules, and this is an area where 
agencies must proceed with caution. To the extent that an agency 
uses social media in the rulemaking process to evangelize, rather 
than to educate or raise awareness, it opens itself up to charges that 
the rulemaking process violated the procedures of the APA or that 
the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the rule.234 
As noted earlier in this Article, evangelization involves advocating a 
doctrine or idea with the object of making converts, whereas educa-
tion simply involves providing persons with information.235 An agency 
evangelizes to shape public input and support for a specific position. 
An agency educates to improve public input and generate support for 
whatever rule the agency ultimately adopts, regardless of whether it 
was the rule advanced by the agency at the outset of the rulemaking. 
 Advocacy organizations recognize the power of social media when 
it is used to organize supporters in collective action and rely on Face-
book, Twitter, and blogs almost every day to evangelize their mission, 
raise funds, and prompt followers to action.236 Agencies are using so-
cial media for similar purposes, following the lead of President 
Obama, who formed an Office of Digital Strategy to generate support 
                                                                                                                  
 232. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE, supra note 26; U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE, supra note 26.  
 233. See infra Part V; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 49. The implications for litiga-
tion would be reduced if the agency were engaging in social media discussions prior to the 
commencement of the rulemaking process. In his report to ACUS, Professor Herz notes 
that agencies could use blogs and social networking prior to the publication of a notice of 
final rulemaking to facilitate increased dialogue among the agency and stakeholders. See 
HERZ, supra note 18, at 36-39.  
 234. See infra Part V.  
 235. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 236. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 6, 11-15, 18-19. 
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for his programs.237 The difference between using social media to 
raise awareness of a rule or the rulemaking process and using social 
media to promote support for a rule is important. The difference is 
apparent in the tone of the message provided by the agency. Unlike 
messages designed to educate or inform, messages designed to gener-
ate support for agency action usually involve some call to action. 
 Social media can be a powerful tool to generate support for a rule. 
EPA’s Thunderclap campaign in the WOTUS rulemaking is estimat-
ed to have reached 1.8 million people.238 In response to that cam-
paign, advocacy organizations on both sides of the debate organized 
their own social media campaigns.239 More than 98 percent of the 1 
million comments received by EPA on the rulemaking were generat-
ed by mass communication campaigns by advocacy organizations.240 
Ultimately, almost 90 percent of the comments received by EPA on 
the rule supported the rule.241  
 Although EPA adopted an aggressive social media campaign for 
the WOTUS rulemaking, which ultimately resulted in strong public 
support for the agency’s rule, the major focus of the agency’s cam-
paign was educational and informational, rather than evangelical. 
EPA’s #DitchTheMyth campaign was a clear example of an educa-
tional campaign. The campaign focused on providing very detailed 
and specific facts to the public to clarify misconceptions regarding the 
rule that were being created by the social media campaign of the 
American Farm Bureau.242  
 The primary focus of the Thunderclap campaign was also educa-
tional and informational, as it provided a link to EPA’s website with 
background information about the proposed rule, the rulemaking 
process, and ways to get involved in the rulemaking process.243  
                                                                                                                  
 237. See Lipton & Shear, supra note 76. EPA indicates that it is the agency’s policy “to 
use social media . . . to meet its mission of protecting human health and the environment.” 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 2. 
 238. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 5; Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29. 
 239. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text; see also Hart et al., supra note 
126, at 27-28.  
 240. See Johnson, Mass Comments, supra note 201; see also Hart et al., supra note 
126, at 28. The largest campaign in opposition to the rule was organized by the Committee 
for a Constructive Tomorrow and generated 62,882 comments. Johnson, Mass Comments, 
supra note 201.  
 241. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.  
 242. Id.  
 243. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. Critics may claim that the cam-
paign was evangelical, rather than informational, because the message provided by EPA 
for the campaign stated, “I support EPA’s efforts to protect [clean water] for my health, my 
family, and my community.” See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 4. Although the agency used 
that message to attract attention to the ongoing rulemaking, the primary focus of the mes-
 
2017]  SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING 1417 
 
 While the #CleanWaterRules campaign also provided links to 
agency web pages with educational material regarding the rulemak-
ing, it focused more heavily than the #DitchTheMyth or Thunderclap 
campaigns on generating support for the agency’s rule. The campaign 
encouraged followers to take pictures of themselves with a #Clean-
WaterRules sign and share the picture (and words of support for 
clean water) on social media.244 To the extent that the campaign in-
cluded an educational message, it was clearly secondary. However, 
the #CleanWaterRules campaign was launched after the comment 
period on the rule was completed and the agency had prepared a final 
rule that was being reviewed by the White House prior to publica-
tion.245 For all intents and purposes, that social media campaign was 
launched at the end of the rulemaking process. The only reason 
agency evangelization of a rule may be problematic is because it 
could demonstrate that the agency is not willing to consider changes 
to a rule during the rulemaking process. That is not a concern when 
the rulemaking process has been completed.  
 Even if an agency uses a social media campaign to evangelize its 
rule during the comment period for the rule, the agency’s rule is not 
per se invalid. There is no statute or rule that prohibits agencies from 
soliciting support for their rules during the rulemaking process.246 An 
agency’s evangelization is only problematic when it is motivated by an 
underlying unwillingness to consider changing the rule based on input 
during the comment period.247 If an agency is unwilling to consider 
changing a rule based on public input, though, the agency’s rule is 
likely to be invalidated regardless of whether the agency used social 
media to generate support for the rule. Social media is not the problem 
in that case. The agency’s closed mind is the problem.  
 While agencies may view social media as a powerful tool to gener-
ate support for a rule, aggressive efforts to generate support for a 
rule may have unintended consequences for agencies. For example, 
although EPA’s social media campaign contributed, to some extent, 
to a flood of public comments and 90 percent support for the rule, the 
rule was still challenged by states, local governments, farmers, de-
                                                                                                                  
sage was to direct readers to the agency’s website, where the agency provided information 
and educational materials on the rule and the issues involved in the rulemaking.  
 244. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.  
 245. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 246. It is, however, unusual. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7. ACUS, for 
instance, recommends that agencies adopt social media plans that are evenhanded and 
encourage all types of stakeholders to participate. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, 
supra note 15, at 76,271.  
 247. See infra Part V.  
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velopers, and other regulated entities in numerous lawsuits.248 Many 
of those challengers expressed resentment over the agency’s social 
media campaign, arguing that the campaign demonstrated the agen-
cy’s refusal to consider public input on the rule.249 Federal legislators 
expressed similar concerns250 and introduced bills to overturn the 
rule.251 In short, even though the social media campaign generated 
fairly broad public support for the rule, it exacerbated the significant 
opposition to the rule from those most likely to challenge the rule and 
delay its implementation. In the end, courts will not care that 90 per-
cent of the public comments supported the agency’s rule. Neither will 
federal legislators, unless those 90 percent are major contributors.  
V.   APPROPRIATIONS LAWS AND SOCIAL MEDIA  
 EPA’s use of social media in the WOTUS rulemaking sparked 
claims that the agency was violating not only the APA but also federal 
appropriations laws. The GAO report mentioned at the outset of this 
Article addressed the appropriations laws’ limits.252 As will be appar-
ent from the following discussion, an agency will be more likely to run 
afoul of appropriations limits when it is using a social media campaign 
to evangelize than when it is using the tools to increase awareness, 
educate the public, or increase transparency of its rules. Although 
GAO found that the agency violated some provisions of those laws, in 
the long term, appropriations laws will impose far fewer restrictions 
than the APA on agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking.  
                                                                                                                  
 248. Within the first two days after the agencies published the final rule, twenty-seven 
states filed lawsuits challenging the rule. See Chris Marr, More Than Half of States Sue 
EPA to Block Rule on Water Jurisdiction, 46 ENV’T REP. 2012 (June 30, 2015). Within an-
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Saiyid & Anthony Adragna, Chamber of Commerce Joins in Water Rule Lawsuit, 46 ENV’T 
REP. 2143 (July 13, 2015).  
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 252. See GAO Report, supra note 1.  
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A.   Statutory Limitations  
 Pursuant to the Antideficiency Act, federal agencies may only 
spend money in ways authorized by Congress.253 When Congress ap-
propriates funds to agencies, it is not unusual for the legislature to 
impose limits on the agencies’ use of those funds.254 The limitations 
that applied to EPA’s use of funds for the WOTUS rulemaking were 
typical of limits that Congress places on most agencies when it ap-
propriates funds to the agencies. Section 718 of the Financial Ser-
vices and General Government Appropriations Act of 2014 prohibited 
the use of EPA’s appropriations for unauthorized “publicity or propa-
ganda purposes.”255 Section 715 of that law prohibited the use of 
EPA’s appropriations for “indirect or ‘grassroots’ lobbying in support 
of, or in opposition to, pending legislation.”256  
 The limitations in appropriations laws are interpreted and admin-
istered by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is 
headed by the Comptroller General.257 With regard to the provisions 
in appropriations laws that prohibit unauthorized “publicity or prop-
aganda,” GAO has interpreted the provisions to limit three categories 
of activities by agencies: (1) “self-aggrandizement” by public officials; 
(2) “covert propaganda” that is designed to influence the public with-
out identifying the government as the source of the information; and 
(3) “materials that are purely partisan in nature.”258 Since agencies 
must communicate information to the public regularly and may have 
statutory missions to educate the public, GAO interprets the limits 
on agencies’ use of funding for publicity narrowly.259  
                                                                                                                  
 253. The statute makes it unlawful for a federal agency to “make or authorize an 
expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation.” 31 
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 254. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1353 (1988).  
 255. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 718, 128 Stat. 5, 234. 
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assets/670/668991.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN2L-8M92] [hereinafter GAO 2015 Annual Update]. 
 259. See Robert H. Wood, Lining the Pockets of Publicists with Federal Funds: The 
Prohibition Against Use of Agency Appropriations for Publicity and Propaganda, 7 LOY. J. 
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 With regard to “self-aggrandizement,” GAO defines the term to 
mean “publicity of a nature tending to emphasize the importance of 
the agency or activity in question.”260 The prohibition against self-
aggrandizement does not prohibit agencies from engaging in legiti-
mate information activities, so GAO has been reluctant to find viola-
tions of the limits as long as agencies can provide a reasonable justi-
fication for their activities.261 Along those lines, the GAO has found 
that agencies may use funds to advocate their positions, even on con-
troversial subjects, to report on their programs, justify their policies, 
and respond to criticism, without violating the prohibition against 
self-aggrandizement.262  
 With regard to “covert propaganda,” GAO defines the term to 
mean “materials such as editorials or other articles prepared by an 
agency or its contractors at the behest of the agency and circulated as 
the ostensible position of parties outside the agency.”263 GAO will find 
such materials to be covert propaganda when the agency has con-
cealed its role in producing or distributing the information.264  
 With regard to “materials that are purely partisan in nature,” 
GAO has stated that “the offending materials must be found to have 
been ‘designated to aid a political party or candidate.’ ”265 Because it 
is often difficult to determine whether agency materials are purely 
political, one standard applied by the GAO is that “the use of appro-
priated funds is improper only if the activity is ‘completely devoid of 
any connection with official functions.’ ”266 
B.   EPA’s Use of Social Media in the WOTUS Rule  
 After EPA finalized its WOTUS rule, Senator James Inhofe, chair 
of the Senate’s Committee on Environment and Public Works, asked 
GAO to investigate whether EPA’s use of social media in the rule-
making violated the appropriations limits on unauthorized publicity 
or propaganda or the limits on lobbying.267 In response, GAO exam-
                                                                                                                  
PUB. INT. L. 133, 147 (2006). According to the “necessary expense doctrine” implemented by 
the GAO, since Congress cannot specify every detail of authorized expenditures in legisla-
tion, agencies may use reasonable discretion in determining how to carry out the purposes 
of the legislation. See RED BOOK, supra note 257, at 4-19 to 4-20.  
 260. See RED BOOK, supra note 257, at 4-199.  
 261. Id. at 4-200.  
 262. See Wood, supra note 259, at 147-48.  
 263. See RED BOOK, supra note 257, at 4-202. 
 264. Id.  
 265. See GAO 2015 Annual Update, supra note 258, at 4-32 (citations omitted). 
 266. Id. (citations omitted). To date, the GAO has not found that an agency’s materials 
have been so partisan as to violate this prohibition. See id. at 4-33. 
 267. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 1.  
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ined whether EPA’s use of Thunderclap or its #DitchTheMyth or 
#CleanWaterRules social media campaigns violated those limits.268 
EPA indicated that it used social media in the WOTUS rulemaking 
“to clarify the issues concerning the . . . proposed rule, to provide in-
formation about streams and wetlands, to demonstrate the rule’s rel-
evance, to provide opportunities for public engagement, and to cor-
rect what it viewed as misinformation concerning the rule.”269  
 GAO ultimately concluded that EPA’s #DitchTheMyth campaign 
did not violate any of the appropriations limits.270 In addition, it con-
cluded that the agency’s #CleanWaterRules campaign did not violate 
any of the limits on publicity or propaganda,271 although an EPA blog 
post that was part of that campaign linked to an external website in 
a manner that the GAO concluded violated the anti-lobbying limits of 
EPA’s appropriations laws.272 Finally, GAO concluded that EPA’s use 
of Thunderclap did not violate the anti-lobbying provisions of the ap-
propriations laws and did not violate the limits on self-
aggrandizement.273 However, GAO determined that EPA did not ade-
quately attribute the Thunderclap message to the agency, so its use 
of Thunderclap constituted covert propaganda.274 Despite the outcry 
by critics of the agency, GAO’s report demonstrates that the appro-
priations laws impose fairly minor restrictions on agencies’ use of so-
cial media. EPA used social media very aggressively to generate sup-
port for its WOTUS rule and very few of its actions were found to 
have violated the self-aggrandizement, covert propaganda, or anti-
lobbying provisions of the appropriations laws. To the extent that the 
report found minor violations of the laws, those violations can be eas-
ily avoided in social media campaigns in future rulemakings. 
1.   #DitchTheMyth and #CleanWaterRules and the Publicity and 
Propaganda Limits 
 As noted above, the publicity and propaganda limits in EPA’s ap-
propriations laws limit unauthorized self-aggrandizement, covert 
propaganda, and purely partisan activities by agencies. The GAO re-
port did not find that any EPA actions were partisan, but reviewed 
several statements in the #CleanWaterRules campaign to determine if 
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they constituted self-aggrandizement.275 Several of the social media 
posts touted benefits or positive changes that the agency’s rule would 
effect, including: “Our new rule protects clean water and in turn pro-
tects everything that depends on it—including your neighborhood gro-
cery store,” and “Our Clean Water Rule was just finalized. . . . That’s 
great news for people’s health, the environment and our economy.”276 
In the report, GAO indicated that a primary purpose of the prohibi-
tion on self-aggrandizement is to limit “communication with an obvi-
ous purpose of puffery” and that GAO “balanc[es] the restriction with 
an agency’s right to disseminate information regarding its views and 
policies”; thus, GAO “traditionally afford[s] agencies wide discretion 
in their informational activities.”277 While the social media posts em-
phasized the importance of the agency’s rule, GAO stressed that “en-
gendering praise for the agency was not the goal,” so GAO concluded 
that the agency was not engaged in self-aggrandizing activities in the 
campaign.278 GAO also noted that the National Environmental Edu-
cation Act of 1990 and the E-Government Act of 2002 “evidence Con-
gress’ interest in EPA informing the public regarding its policies and 
views” and that the appropriations limits should be interpreted in 
harmony with those provisions.279 In light of the GAO’s deferential 
review of EPA’s statements in praise of its rulemaking, it is likely 
that the self-aggrandizement limit in the agency’s appropriations 
laws present very few obstacles to agency’s use of social media to 
publicize and praise their activities. 
 GAO also reviewed EPA’s tweets in the #DitchTheMyth social media 
campaign and concluded that the agency’s tweets did not constitute 
covert propaganda because the graphics used in the campaign included 
the EPA logo and the tweets included the EPAWater handle at the end, 
clearly signifying that EPA was responsible for the messages.280  
2.   Thunderclap and the Publicity and Propaganda Limits 
 GAO did not find that EPA’s use of Thunderclap violated the pure-
ly partisan or self-aggrandizement limits of the agency’s appropria-
tions laws. However, the report found that EPA’s Thunderclap mes-
sage violated the covert propaganda limits of the appropriations 
laws.281 As noted earlier in this Article, once a campaign reaches a 
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specific number of supporters in Thunderclap, the platform posts a 
message drafted by the campaign organizer to the supporters’ social 
media accounts.282 The message that EPA drafted provided, “Clean 
water is important to me. I support EPA’s efforts to protect it for my 
health, my family, and my community.”283 Even though EPA adver-
tised the campaign, recruited followers for the campaign, and com-
posed a message that included a reference to EPA and linked to 
EPA’s website for the proposed rule, GAO determined that the agen-
cy’s message concealed EPA’s involvement in the campaign.284 GAO 
concluded that while the initial followers of EPA’s campaign would be 
aware that EPA initiated the campaign, persons who saw the mes-
sage on the social media sites of the initial followers would not be 
aware of that connection.285 GAO noted that “[i]t is not enough that 
an agency disclose its role to the conduit of such material if it has not 
taken measures to identify its role to the intended recipient.”286  
 GAO found that “EPA constructed a message to be shared by oth-
ers that refers to EPA in the third person and advocates support of 
the agency’s efforts” and that by doing so, “EPA deliberately disasso-
ciates itself as the writer, when the message was in fact written, and 
its posting solicited, by EPA.”287 GAO distinguished EPA’s use of 
Thunderclap from the simple re-tweeting or sharing of a Facebook 
post, noting that the previous or original author’s identity would be 
disclosed in either of those cases, whereas Thunderclap does not re-
tain such identifying information.288 While GAO concluded that 
EPA’s Thunderclap campaign violated the covert propaganda limits 
in its appropriations laws, the decision should provide only a minor 
roadblock to agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking. In the fu-
ture, EPA and other agencies will need to compose any Thunderclap 
messages more carefully to directly attribute the message to the 
agency. Similarly, to the extent that new social media delivery plat-
forms are developed, agencies should take care to ensure that their 
messages will be formatted in a manner that attributes the message 
to the agency when it is delivered to all of the ultimate recipients.  
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3.   #CleanWaterRules and the Anti-Lobbying Limits  
 EPA’s policy on using social media to communicate with the public 
prohibits agency employees from directly or indirectly lobbying Con-
gress,289 and the agency’s Twitter guidance prohibits employees from 
lobbying or promoting political viewpoints,290 so it is not surprising 
that GOA found that most of the components of EPA’s social media 
campaign in the WOTUS rulemaking did not violate the anti-
lobbying provisions of EPA’s appropriations laws. It is surprising, 
though, that GAO came to the opposite conclusion when it found that 
an EPA blog post linking to an advocacy organization web page 
which then linked to a separate web page urging viewers to contact 
Congress violated the anti-lobbying provisions.291  
 As noted earlier, the EPA appropriations legislation, like most ap-
propriations legislation, prohibits “indirect or ‘grassroots’ lobbying in 
support of, or in opposition to, pending legislation.”292 According to 
GAO, “th[at] provision is violated wh[en] there is evidence of a clear 
appeal by an agency to the public to contact Members of Congress in 
support of, or in opposition to, pending legislation,” regardless of 
whether the appeal identifies a specific piece of legislation.293 As part 
of the agency’s #CleanWaterRules campaign, an EPA employee post-
ed a blog entry in which the author indicated that clean water was 
important to him because he is a surfer and doesn’t want to get sick 
from pollution and because he drinks beer and brewers need clean 
water to brew beer.294 On its face, the blog entry does not appear to 
urge the public to contact Congress in support of, or opposition to, 
any legislation. However, the paragraph regarding the author’s in-
terest in surfing included a link to a Surfrider Foundation web page 
that discussed clean water, and the paragraph regarding the author’s 
interest in beer included a link to the Natural Resources Defense 
Council’s (NRDC) Brewers for Clean Water Page.295 Although neither 
of those web pages directly urged visitors to contact Congress in sup-
port of, or opposition to, specific legislation, and the NRDC web page 
did not even mention Congress, each web page linked to another web 
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page that prompted visitors to contact Congress to express opposition 
to bills that would weaken the Clean Water Act or to express their 
support for strong Clean Water Act protections of waters of the Unit-
ed States.296 Neither of the action pages identified specific bills that 
were pending.297 However, in light of the fact that there were bills 
pending in Congress that would weaken the Clean Water Act at the 
time that the blog post linked to the external websites that linked to 
the action pages, GAO concluded EPA, through its blog post, ap-
pealed to the public to contact Congress in opposition to pending leg-
islation in violation of the grassroots lobbying prohibition in its 
appropriations laws.298 
 Even though the call to action was posted on external websites 
and was made by third parties, rather than EPA, GAO concluded 
that EPA “conveyed a message through the expressive act” of linking 
to the external websites.299 GAO cited several factors that influenced 
its determination. First, it noted that the external websites very 
clearly and prominently urged visitors to take some action to protect 
clean water.300 Second, it noted that EPA linked to the websites from 
its blog post at a critical time in the rulemaking process when public 
expression of support for the rule to Congress would be very help-
ful.301 In addition, GAO noted that the websites to which EPA linked 
were both maintained by activist advocacy organizations.302  
 To the extent that the GAO found that EPA’s blog post violated 
the anti-lobbying provisions of EPA’s appropriations laws, GAO has 
adopted a fairly broad reading of those limitations. The report even 
suggests that an agency can be liable for violating the anti-lobbying 
provisions if the agency links to a website that does not include an 
appeal for citizen action, but the website owner adds such an appeal 
later. Specifically, GAO noted that it was not clear whether the Surf-
rider page included an action prompt when EPA initially linked to it, 
but that it included an action prompt after EPA linked to it; thus, 
GAO concluded that “EPA is responsible for the message it continues 
to endorse, rather than just the message as it may have existed at a 
single point in time.”303 
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 In light of GAO’s interpretation of the anti-lobbying provisions of 
EPA’s appropriations laws, the agency may choose to avoid linking to 
external sites in its social media campaigns or to be vigilant in moni-
toring those sites to which it links to ensure that the first level sites 
do not prominently urge visitors to take some action that might ulti-
mately result in lobbying members of Congress. 
C.   Enforcement of Appropriations Laws 
 Although EPA contested GAO’s determination that the agency 
engaged in covert propaganda and ‘grassroots lobbying’ in the 
WOTUS rulemaking,304 there are very few sanctions available to pun-
ish agencies if they don’t comply with appropriations laws, so the lim-
its in those laws are likely to have little impact on agencies’ use of 
social media in rulemaking. In the WOTUS rulemaking, for instance, 
when GAO concluded that the agency violated the limits in the agen-
cy’s appropriations laws, it noted that “[t]he agency should determine 
the cost associated with the prohibited conduct and include the 
amount in its report of its Antideficiency Act violation.”305 The An-
tideficiency Act requires agency heads to “report . . . to the President 
and Congress all relevant facts and a statement of actions taken” 
when an agency spends appropriations outside of the authority dele-
gated to it by Congress.306 Thus, if an agency uses social media in 
rulemaking in a way that violates the limits on the agency’s appropria-
tions, the agency may have to reimburse the Treasury for the funds 
expended in violation of the appropriations limits. Beyond that, the 
law imposes few sanctions. Significantly, the validity of a rule will not 
be impacted by an agency’s violation of appropriations limits. While an 
agency employee who spends appropriations outside of the agency’s 
delegated authority is nominally subject to criminal penalties,307 no 
employee or officer has ever been prosecuted for such violations.308  
 Although the GAO is charged by Congress with interpreting and 
administering appropriations laws and the GAO asserts that the 
Comptroller General’s decisions are binding on agencies,309 the 
Comptroller General is a legislative branch officer,310 and the Justice 
Department takes the position that GAO’s opinions and legal inter-
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pretations are not binding on the Executive Branch.311 Further, the 
Comptroller General does not have any statutory authority to enforce 
its opinions or interpretations,312 so the GAO can only report per-
ceived violations of appropriations limits to Congress, the President, 
and the Justice Department.313 Even if the Executive Branch con-
cludes that an agency’s action may have violated appropriations lim-
its, the Justice Department will not sue a federal agency for those 
violations in light of the Unitary Executive Theory.314 In addition, 
even if violations of appropriations limits may be challenged judicial-
ly in some cases by appropriate plaintiffs, courts have often declined 
to decide such cases on the merits.315  
 Therefore, the only repercussions that agencies may have to face in 
light of violations of appropriations laws caused by social media cam-
paigns would come from Congress in the form of oversight hearings and 
some further limits on appropriations tailored to the agency’s violations.  
VI.   SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE APA  
 Although appropriations laws may not impose significant limits on 
agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking, the APA imposes more 
serious limits on the use of those tools, at least when agencies are 
using them for purposes of evangelization, as opposed to the other 
legitimate purposes outlined above. An agency could encounter prob-
lems if it is so aggressive in its efforts to use social media to generate 
support for positions advanced in a proposed rule that it appears the 
agency does not wish to receive any input that opposes those posi-
tions. In that case, the agency risks having the rule it ultimately 
adopts invalidated on the grounds that the agency failed to provide 
an opportunity for comment on the rule as required by the APA, or 
that the agency’s rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency 
failed to consider relevant factors or alternatives to the final rule.  
 Except in limited situations, the APA requires agencies to provide 
notice and an opportunity for comment when they adopt legislative 
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rules.316 A series of decisions in the federal appellate courts held that 
an agency does not provide an opportunity for comment on proposed 
rules if the agency does not remain ‘open-minded’ about the issues 
raised and engage with the comments submitted during the comment 
period.317 “The opportunity for comment must be a meaningful oppor-
tunity . . . .”318 However, the fact that an agency does not change a 
rule in response to public comments does not necessarily indicate 
that the agency lacked the requisite open mind towards comments.319 
In many of the cases where an appellate court has found that an 
agency had not provided an opportunity for comment on a rule, the 
evidence that the court relied upon was the short time period be-
tween the end of the comment period and the adoption of the final 
rule or the agency’s failure to provide challengers with information 
upon which the agency based its rule, rather than statements made 
by the agency during the comment period.320 While overly aggressive 
calls for public support of a rule during the comment period may be 
problematic, the fact that an agency makes comments during the 
comment period in support of its proposed rule does not necessarily 
indicate that the agency has predetermined the outcome of the rule-
making. Agencies develop proposed rules after much deliberation and 
one would hope that they enter the process believing that they have 
proposed a rule that is consistent with their authority under the law 
and that rationally balances competing interests within the range of 
acceptable policy discretion granted to them by Congress. As the D.C. 
Circuit has noted, “In order to avoid trenching upon the agency’s pol-
icy prerogatives, . . . we presume that policymakers approach their 
quasi-legislative task of rulemaking with an open mind—but not an 
empty one.”321 Similarly, that court has held that “[a]n administra-
tive official is presumed to be objective and . . . mere proof that [he 
or] she has taken a public position, or has expressed strong views, or 
holds an underlying philosophy with respect to an issue in dispute 
cannot overcome that presumption.”322  
                                                                                                                  
 316. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).  
 317. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011); Ru-
ral Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Advocates for Highway and 
Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994); McLouth Steel 
Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
 318. Rural Cellular Ass’n, 588 F.3d at 1101 (citation omitted).  
 319. See Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292.  
 320. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d 431; Wash. Gas Energy Servs., Inc. 
v. D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 893 A.2d 981 (D.C. 2006). 
 321. PLMRS Narrowband Corp. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also 
Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 322. United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
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 Accordingly, positive statements by the agency that encourage 
support for a rule or input on a rule are generally acceptable. Howev-
er, to the extent that an agency solicits support, through social media 
or otherwise, in a way that sends a message that the agency is only 
interested in input that advances the approach that they have sug-
gested in a proposed rule, it is more likely that a court might find 
that the agency is not interested in engaging with the comments and 
is not maintaining an open mind during the rulemaking. Indeed, sev-
eral Senators alleged that EPA’s social media campaign in the 
WOTUS rulemaking demonstrated that EPA had predetermined the 
outcome of the rulemaking and was not approaching the comment 
period with an open mind.323 Members of the House of Representa-
tives raised similar concerns when questioning EPA Administrator 
Gina McCarthy at a House Agriculture Committee hearing after the 
rule was finalized.324 
 Several of the complaints raised by the Senators addressed state-
ments made by EPA in its #DitchTheMyth campaign.325 However, 
EPA’s statements were simply clarifications of misstatements being 
advanced by the American Farm Bureau in its social media cam-
paign.326 The mere fact that an agency disagrees with the mischarac-
terization of facts supporting a rule does not indicate that the agency 
is proceeding with a closed mind in the rulemaking. Arguably, as op-
ponents of an agency’s rule are more aggressive in spreading disin-
formation about a proposed rule, an agency should be able to be more 
aggressive in providing accurate information without being accused 
of having predetermined the outcome of the rulemaking.  
 The Senators also suggested that EPA’s Thunderclap campaign 
demonstrated that the agency had predetermined the outcome of the 
rulemaking,327 but in that message, the agency was simply spreading 
the word that it was engaged in an important rulemaking to protect 
water quality and urging public participation in the process by direct-
ing interested persons to the agency’s website for the rule.328 EPA’s 
solicitation of support for the WOTUS rule came close to evangeliza-
tion at the end of the process, when the agency pursued its #Clean-
WaterRules campaign, but those calls for support came after the 
                                                                                                                  
 323. See Letter from 24 U.S. Senators, supra note 75. The Senators wrote, “EPA’s so-
cial media advocacy removes any pretense that the agency will act as a fair and neutral 
arbiter during the rulemaking” and “EPA’s social media advocacy is a firm indicator that 
adverse comments will receive scant attention during the rulemaking period.” Id.  
 324. See Fong, supra note 75.  
 325. See Letter from 24 U.S. Senators, supra note 75.  
 326. See supra notes 137-38, and accompanying text.  
 327. See Letter from 24 U.S. Senators, supra note 75. 
 328. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.  
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comment period was closed and the agency was preparing to publish 
a final rule that included several changes that responded to public 
comments.329 Even if the agency had closed its mind at that time, it 
would have been appropriate for it to do so. Although EPA did not 
cross a line in its use of social media in the WOTUS rulemaking, agen-
cies must be careful to avoid using those tools so aggressively that it 
sends the message that the agency will not consider opposing view-
points in the rulemaking, or they risk having their rules invalidated 
for failure to provide an opportunity for comment under the APA.  
 In the same way that agency evangelization of a rule may lead to 
claims that the agency violated the procedures of the APA for notice-
and-comment rulemaking, it may lead to claims that the agency’s 
final rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to 
consider, or foreclosed consideration of, relevant factors or alterna-
tives. Under the APA, courts are empowered to strike down agency 
actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”330 
In general, the arbitrary and capricious standard is a fairly deferen-
tial standard and does not allow courts to substitute their judgment 
for the agency’s judgment.331 However, in certain circumstances, 
courts apply a more rigorous form of arbitrary and capricious review, 
known as “hard look” review, to agency actions.332 Through hard look 
review, courts require agencies to thoroughly explain the reasoning 
for their decision; courts focus on, among other things, whether the 
agency has considered all of the relevant factors and alternatives in 
making its decision.333 As the Supreme Court explained in Motor Ve-
hicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co., an agency decision can be arbitrary under the test  
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it 
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be as-
cribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.334 
                                                                                                                  
 329. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 21. 
 330. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  
 331. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  
 332. The term “hard look” review originated in opinions of Judge Harold Leventhal in 
the D.C. Circuit. See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1970); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  
 333. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416.  
 334. 463 U.S. at 43.  
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Professor Cass Sunstein suggests that courts use hard look review, in 
part, to assure that agencies allow effective participation in agency 
decisionmaking by affected interests.335  
 When an agency uses social media to evangelize a proposed rule in 
a way that suggests that the agency is not interested in receiving or 
considering input that varies from the approach taken by the agency 
in the proposal, challengers may try to use that as evidence that the 
agency is failing to consider an important aspect of the problem, is 
considering improper factors as the basis for its rule, or is attempting 
to prevent interested persons from participating in the decisionmak-
ing process. A federal district court in Wyoming bought arguments 
like those when it ruled in favor of an industry trade group that chal-
lenged a National Park Service rule that limited snowmobile use in 
various National Parks.336 The court relied on several statements 
made by agency officials during the rulemaking process about the 
problems created by snowmobile use in the parks to find that the 
Park Service had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by making a pre-
determined political decision regarding the rule and failing to seri-
ously consider the public comments submitted during the process.337  
 Decisions like the Wyoming federal district court decision are, 
however, the exception rather than the norm. In most cases, courts 
will not invalidate an agency’s rule simply because the agency makes 
strong statements supporting the rule during the comment period. As 
long as the agency demonstrates in its explanation that it considered 
all of the factors and alternatives suggested by the commenters and 
required by law, did not consider factors or alternatives which it was 
not authorized to consider, and reasonably weighed all of the evi-
dence before it in finalizing its rule, the rule will likely be held valid. 
To the extent that the statute under which the agency is promulgat-
ing the rule provides it with a range of discretion in making the rule, 
courts will not substitute their judgment for the agency if the agency 
has adequately explained the reasons for its decision.338  
                                                                                                                  
 335. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REV. 177, 181 (1983).  
 336. See Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 304 F. Supp. 2d. 1278 (D. Wyo. 2004).  
 337. Id. at 1289-94.  
 338. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial 
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 758-60 (2006). While agencies are frequently motivated by 
political considerations in their exercise of discretion, they rarely disclose that as a factor 
in their decisionmaking. See generally Stephen M. Johnson, Disclosing the President’s Role 
in Rulemaking: A Critique of the Reform Proposals, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1003 (2011). In 
most cases, if the agency doesn’t identify political considerations as a factor in its deci-
sionmaking, courts will not reach the conclusion, as the federal district court in Wyoming 
did, that the agency was influenced by those factors.  
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 Nevertheless, if an agency is too aggressive in its social media 
campaign during a rulemaking, so that it appears that the agency 
has predetermined the outcome of the rulemaking, courts will likely 
examine the agency’s consideration of factors and alternatives, and 
its explanation for the final rule, much more closely, and may even 
require the agency to provide additional justification for its rule be-
fore upholding it.339 Courts may be similarly diligent in their review 
of agency rules if it appears that the agency used social networking 
to solicit one-sided input in support of the rule (contour the record).340  
VII.   CONCLUSION  
 Social networking is ubiquitous in the United States. A 2015 Pew 
Research Center study found that almost two-thirds of adults and 90 
percent of adults under the age of thirty use social networking 
sites.341 Another Pew survey found that almost two-thirds of Twitter 
and Facebook users said that they relied on those social networking 
platforms as a news source.342 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
government agencies are beginning to incorporate social media tools 
into the rulemaking process. As noted above, social networks can 
help agencies increase awareness that rules are being proposed, in-
crease transparency in the rulemaking process, and can play some 
role in educating the public about the rules, the rulemaking process, 
and the issues involved in proposed rules.343 While agencies have not 
yet been able to use social networks to improve the quality of com-
ments or access localized information, it may also be possible for 
them to do that through more targeted use of social media tools.344  
                                                                                                                  
 339. Professor Louis Virelli suggests that courts should review, as part of the hard look 
review, the procedures that an agency uses to ensure that the information that it receives 
is reliable and the breadth of information that an agency considers in its decisionmaking. 
See Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
721, 745-50 (2014). Although courts have not, in the past, focused on those issues directly 
when applying the hard look analysis, if they did, it would be more likely that a court 
would find that an agency’s social media campaign that discouraged public input or en-
couraged one-sided public input was arbitrary or capricious.  
 340. Using Professor Virelli’s analysis, a court might find that an agency that engages 
in information contouring is acting arbitrarily because it is limiting the information that it 
receives during the rulemaking process or because it hasn’t taken steps to ensure that the 
information is reliable. Id.  
 341. See Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR.  
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/N3ME-SNWU]. 
 342. See Michael Barthee et al., The Evolving Role of News on Twitter and Face-
book, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 14, 2015), http://www.journalism.org/2015/07/14/ 
the-evolving-role-of-news-on-twitter-and-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/B846-S92X]. 
 343. See supra Parts III.A. & B.  
 344. See supra Part III.C. In its 2013 recommendations, ACUS suggests, “[I]f an agen-
cy needs to reach an elusive audience or determine public preferences or reactions in order 
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 As agencies increasingly use social networking to achieve those goals, 
though, they must be careful to avoid using the tools to evangelize their 
rules or to contour the record to support their rules. When they engage 
in such conduct, they risk having their rules overturned as arbitrary 
and capricious or procedurally invalid. In addition, they run the risk of 
alienating the public, or segments of the public, who may feel that the 
agency is simply using the rulemaking process to build popular support 
for the rule or to build a judicially defensible record for an outcome that 
was determined before the agency sought public input. In those cases, 
the agency risks sacrificing all of the benefits that are normally associ-
ated with public participation in a transparent, open rulemaking pro-
cess, including public support and acceptance for the final rule, ease of 
enforcement, and reduced judicial challenges.  
 Finally, when an agency is using social media to evangelize a rule 
or contour the record, it may be tempted to engage in activities that 
constitute covert propaganda, self-aggrandizement, or grassroots lob-
bying, in violation of federal appropriations laws. While the penalties 
for those violations are minor, the negative publicity surrounding the 
violations can increase opposition to the rule.  
 For all of those reasons, agencies should follow the guidance of 
ACUS and develop a plan for using social media if it will be used in 
rulemaking. ACUS recognizes that “social media may not be appro-
priate and productive in all rulemakings,” but that it can be used “to 
supplement or improve the traditional commenting process.”345 
Therefore, ACUS recommends, “Before using social media in connec-
tion with a particular rulemaking, agencies should identify the spe-
cific goals they expect to achieve through the use of social media and 
carefully consider the potential costs and benefits.”346 Further, ACUS 
recommends, “Agencies should use the social media tools that best fit 
their particular purposes and goals and should carefully consider 
how to effectively integrate those tools into the traditional rulemak-
ing process.”347 Finally, ACUS recommends that “agencies must 
clearly communicate to the public how the social media discussion 
will be used in the rulemaking.”348 
 The strategic planning and use of social media by the CeRI in its 
Regulation Room program is a model for federal agencies.349 EPA’s ex-
                                                                                                                  
to develop an effective regulation, social media may enable the collection of information 
and data that are rarely reflected in traditional rulemaking comments.” See ACUS Rec-
ommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270.  
 345. Id. at 76,271. 
 346. Id.  
 347. Id.  
 348. Id. at 76,270. 
 349. See supra notes 164-68, 193-98 and accompanying text.  
1434  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1379 
 
perience with the WOTUS rulemaking, on the other hand, demon-
strates that the agency must work a little harder to implement ACUS’ 
recommendations. While EPA has a social media policy, a policy on 
using social media to communicate with the public, Facebook guid-
ance, and Twitter guidance, the agency does not have a policy that di-
rectly addresses the appropriate use of social media in rulemaking. In 
order to use social media effectively and appropriately in the rulemak-
ing process, EPA and federal agencies in general should adopt and uti-
lize policies that implement ACUS’ recommendations before embark-
ing on major social media campaigns in future rulemakings.  
